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ACIAR’s impact assessment reports provide information on project 
impacts, which helps to guide future research activities. While the main 
focus of these commissioned reports is on measuring the dollar returns to 
agricultural research, emphasis is also given to analysing the impacts of 
projects on poverty reduction.
During the 1990s ACIAR supported two projects to study the economic 
consequences of alternative routes to policy reform that will lead to an 
integrated national grain market in China. The findings, which have been 
published in Chinese and English, will enable economists to predict with 
greater accuracy the effects of different market reforms on China's 
domestic economy, and their implications for world markets.
The projects focused on understanding the political economy of the 
Chinese domestic grain marketing system (mainly rice, wheat and maize). 
The system was characterised by a lack of competition, costly 
inefficiencies, and cycles of reform. It was a complicated marketing 
system with extensive government control over pricing, transportation and 
storage. 
In 1999–2000 the project team surveyed 1000 households in five 
provinces and 20 counties. This provided a micro basis to support an 
aggregate analysis of grain flows among regions. 
The outputs from the projects should help Australians better understand 
the long- and short-run implications of China’s accession to WTO as well 
as China’s inter-regional grain trade volumes and regional comparative 
advantage in various crops. This will help to identify opportunities for 
Australian agriculture in terms of future trade relations with China. 
Project results have had a positive role in promoting a new round of grain 
marketing reform in China. At the final review of the project the Chinese 
project leader commented that results had been used in decision-making 
by high level administration in China.
This impact assessment was carried out to assess the benefits of economic 
research in grain market reform in China and attribute some share of these 
benefits to ACIAR’s investment in this area of research. Simultaneously, 
given that economic evaluation procedures have been applied to economic 
policy research in only a limited number of studies, this impact assessment  
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was undertaken as a step towards advancing methods associated with 
assessing the impact of research in social sciences.
This report is number 26 in ACIAR’s Impact Assessment Series and is 




Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research 
5
 




































Implications for assessing the ACIAR-funded 
projects 22
 






3.1 Trends in grain production in China  23
3.2 The agricultural policy-making process in China  23
3.3 Grain-market reform in China since the late 1980s  26
3.4 Evidence of the integration of grain markets in 
China 30
3.5 Measures of the welfare gains from grain-market 
reform in China  35
 
4 Potential welfare gains from grain-market
reform 36
 
4.1 Characterising intervention in grain markets 36
4.2 Parameterising the model of welfare gains from 
grain market reform 38
4.3 Trends in the welfare costs of intervention in 
grain markets 40
4.4 Qualifying this approach to estimating potential 
welfare gains 43
 
5 The ACIAR-funded grain market reform 
projects 45
 
5.1 Project outputs 45
5.2 Other activities emerging from projects  46 
6
 




IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF ACIAR-FUNDED PROJECTS ON GRAIN-MARKET REFORM IN CHINA
 
5.3 Project findings  46
5.4 Project influence  47
5.5 ADP/1998/128—achieving food security in China: 
implications of likely WTO accession  49
 








6.2 Views on grain-market reform  52
6.3 Distributional consequences of market reform  53
6.4 The contribution of economic research and the 
ACIAR-funded projects  55
 
7 Benefit–cost analysis of economic policy 






7.1 The ‘with’ and ‘without economic research’ 
scenarios 59
7.2 Attributing welfare gains to the ACIAR-funded 
projects 60
7.3 Expenditure on economic research related to 
grain-marketing policy in China  61















Review of approaches based on Bayesian 
decision theory  72
Review of economic surplus approach  73
 






Project ANRE1/1992/028  75


















.  Price, quantity and value statistics on grains in




  Changes in nominal rates of protection over 
time of China’s major agricultural commodities, 








Trends in the costs of China’s Intervention in 









ACIAR and In-kind Costs for Projects 

















Real Value of Production of Rice, Wheat, Maize 








  Total real deadweight losses from intervention 




  Ratio of total deadweight loss to the total value 




Time path of gains from market reform  59 
8
 




IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF ACIAR-FUNDED PROJECTS ON GRAIN-MARKET REFORM IN CHINA
 
Details of projects evaluated
 
ACIAR project ANRE1/1992/028  Emergence and integration of regional grain markets in China
Collaborating organisations  Department of Economics, University of Adelaide, Australia (UAdel); 
Australian National University; Department of Policy Reform and Law, Ministry 
of Agriculture, China (MOA)
Project leaders  Dr Christopher Findlay (UAdel); Professor Guo Shutian and Mr Luo Yousheng 
(MOA)
Duration of project 1 July 1993 – 30 June 1997
Total ACIAR funding AUD642,623
Project objectives To evaluate (1) the impacts of regional comparative advantage on the emerging 
grain market, (2) the patterns of growth in grain demand in urban China, (3) 
regional demand, supply and trading relationships by grain types, (4) the 
marketing institutions needed to integrate grain markets, and (5) government 
participation in regulating regional and national markets, and to develop a 
database for future use. 
ACIAR project ADP/1997/021  Chinese grain market policy with special emphasis on the domestic grain trade
Collaborating organisations  University of Adelaide, Australia; Ministry of Agriculture, China; Nanjing 
Agricultural University, China
Project leaders  Dr Christopher Findlay (UAdel); Mr Du Ying and Mr Tang Renjian (MOA)
Duration of project 1 July 1999 – 30 April 2003
Total ACIAR funding AUD538,666
Project objectives The main aims were to assess the current transfers of grain between regions 
within China, to examine constraints on grain movements, and to evaluate 
policies that could affect transfers. 
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An assessment has been made of two projects (ANRE1/1992/028 and 
ADP/1997/021) funded by ACIAR dealing with economic research into 
grain-marketing policy in China. The focus of these projects has been on 
presenting theoretical and empirical arguments that China would benefit 
from efficiency gains if there were less intervention by the government in 
grain marketing. ACIAR has routinely conducted impact assessments of 
investments it has made in research leading to the development of new 
agricultural technologies. An objective of this impact assessment has been 
to assess how well economic-evaluation procedures can be applied to 
economic-policy research. 
Every effort has been made to quantify the benefits and costs associated 
with the ACIAR-funded projects. Since 1994, real expenditure (2002 
dollars) on these projects, including in-kind contributions from partners, 
has amounted to about A$2.7m. In the late 1990s, the extent of 
intervention in grain marketing by the Chinese Government rose rather 
than fell. In quantifying benefits in this impact assessment, the 
contribution of the projects has been assumed to be a bringing forward of 
the time at which the Chinese Government returns to a process of policy 
reform that was evident until the late 1990s. The annual welfare gains to 
China from a return to this reform process may be in the order of 1500m 
yuan per year. This represents the difference in losses to China between 
the situation of the late 1990s when the welfare costs of intervention were 
about 0.5% of the value of grain production and the situation before that, 
when welfare costs had been about 0.2% of the value of grain production. 
There are many sources of research and policy advice to the Chinese 
Government. If this body of economic research brings forward policy 
reform from the end of 2004 by between 3 and 6 months, the present value 
of benefits is estimated to be between A$40.3m and A$88.6m. Assuming 
that the cost of this total body of research is around A$13.5m, net present 
value (NPV) for this body of research is in the range A$27m–$75m, and 
the benefit–cost ratio (BCR) is between 3:1 and 6.6:1. On their own, the 
ACIAR-funded projects are likely to advance the pace of reform less than 
the total body of economic research. If the ACIAR-funded projects alone 
bring forward policy reform from the end of 2004 by 1 month then the 
present value of the investment is A$12.7m and, given that the cost of the 
ACIAR-funded research is approximately A$2.7m, the NPV for the 
ACIAR-funded projects is A$10m and the BCR is 4.7:1, which is a 
satisfactory return on funds invested. 
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Other scenarios examined include one where supply response was 
doubled (increasing the welfare costs of intervention) and one where the 
likelihood that the welfare cost of recent intervention was underestimated. 
If welfare costs were 3000m yuan rather than 1500m yuan, then the 
present value of benefits increases to between A$81m and A$179m. The 
corresponding NPV for economic research in advancing policy reform by 
from 3 to 6 months ranges from A$68m to A$166m, and the BCRs are 6.0 
to 13.3:1. In the case of ACIAR advancing reform by even just one month, 
the NPV is A$23m with a BCR of 9.5:1.
Allied with this uncertainty about the total welfare gains from grain 
market reform in China is uncertainty about the distributional impacts of 
so significant an institutional change. No attempt was made to conduct an 
empirical assessment of the winners and losers from grain market reform 
but a qualitative assessment was made in the course of interviewing 
academics and policy-makers about grain marketing in China. 
There seems widespread consensus that consumers would gain, but views 
about the impact on producers were more varied. Most thought that 
producers of high-quality grains and those for whom the opportunity costs 
of producing grain under quota were high would be winners from grain 
reform. They would be able to produce crops for which they had a 
comparative advantage. Some argued that freeing producers from quota 
commitments would be a benefit to the large majority of producers, at least 
after some adjustment period. Those in the southeastern provinces, until 
recently required to produce grain, would shift to other, more profitable 
crops, to the eventual benefit of themselves and of producers in provinces 
with a comparative advantage in grain production. 
The impact of market reform on poor farmers in grain-specialist areas is 
more uncertain. Farmers receiving a protected price for a fixed quota in 
isolated markets face potentially large losses if the government withdraws. 
There are two factors mitigating this impact. First, several studies have 
noted that the budgetary pressures associated with the 1998 policy have 
meant that the state marketing bureau has often sought to discount grain 
purchases in a variety of ways, and hence the losses from marketing 
reform may not be as severe as indicated by the thorough application of 
current procurement policies. Second, these producers may benefit as 
grain production in the southeastern provinces declines. Some argue that 
many poor farmers in grain-dependent areas would be worse off as a result 
of market reform, but this view was not widely shared. 
State-owned grain-marketing enterprises are a significant component of 
the grain-marketing system in China. They have been a vehicle for the  
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implementation of government policy with respect to grain marketing. At 
times they have had the authority to be the monopoly purchaser of grain 
from farmers. They may still handle as much as 70% of grain in China, and 
they employ several million people across the country. They share with 
producers, private traders and consumers in welfare changes associated 
with government intervention to manage the prices and quantities of grain 
in China. The consensus is that this sector would lose as markets opened 
up to private traders. In implementing government policy and in pursuing 
entrepreneurial opportunities these state-owned enterprises have built up 
large debts, as noted above. Central and local governments would be better 
off under market reform were they not forced to prop up these enterprises. 
 
Difficulties in identifying the contribution 
of the ACIAR-funded projects
 
Three key factors have made an empirical benefit–cost analysis (BCA) 
difficult and highly qualified. First, there are no published estimates of the 
welfare costs to China from intervention in grain marketing. A highly 
aggregated, approximate calculation was made during this assessment. It 
is based on uncertain estimates of demand and supply elasticities and 
border protection rates. 
Second, since the mid 1990s the level of government intervention in grain 
marketing in China has increased. Hence, those benefits of this project in 
the form of policy reform are yet to be fully realised. The future path of 
grain marketing reform in China is uncertain. Issues other than efficiency 
— such as food security, grain prices and the related potential for social 
unrest — are other key influences. However, most Chinese academics and 
policy-makers approached during this assessment suggested that some 
level of reform was likely to occur in the next few years. Already there is 
experimentation with ‘freer’ grain marketing in several provinces in the 
southeast of China, and this experiment is expected to be extended to other 
provinces soon. The approach taken here is to assume that, by the end of 
2004, the extent of intervention in grain marketing will retreat to that 
evident in the mid 1990s and perhaps further, in response, in part, to the 
high cost of present policy. The contribution of recent economic-policy 
research, including the ACIAR-funded projects, is assumed to be that the 
mid 1990s level of intervention will be reached several months before the 
end of 2004. The assumptions that some reform would be achieved by the 
end of 2004, and that economic research might speed this up by some 
months, are subjective, but are in line with the policy experiments in 
southeastern provinces. Some may view an assumption that, without 
economic-policy research, the Chinese Government would revert to the  
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degree of market intervention evident in the mid 1990s, as being a 
conservative one (in the sense of understating benefits to economic 
research). It is also true that economic-policy research, including the 
ACIAR-funded projects, may contribute to the further reform of grain-
marketing policy beyond mid 1990s levels in years after 2004. Policy 
reform often takes many years, but even small efficiency gains in a market 
as large as the Chinese grain market, yield significant welfare gains even if 
discounted because of long lags.
Third, there are many government and academic research institutions in 
China, sometimes supported with external funds, that conduct research to 
influence grain-marketing policy. There is no objective way of isolating 
the contribution of the ACIAR-funded projects to decisions about grain-
marketing policy in China. Two, broad, hypothetical scenarios are 
examined in this study. First, an assessment is made of the average return 
to this total body of economic research and the ACIAR-funded projects 
are assumed to be at least as productive as the average based on a review of 
qualitative factors noted below. Expenditure by other institutions is 
unknown, but it is assumed to be five times the expenditure on the ACIAR 
projects. Benefit–cost ratios for this scenario range from 1:1 to 7:1 as 
reform is advanced by 1 to 6 months. The second hypothetical scenario 
assumes that the ACIAR-funded projects alone are responsible for 
speeding up the reform process by from 1 to 6 months with BCRs in the 
range 5:1–35:1. These benefit–cost estimates are based on potential 
benefits from hypothetical reform scenarios. Hence, while they cover the 
likely range of outcomes, there is no empirical support to allow choice 
between any of these scenarios. 
In this assessment, economic-policy research is evaluated using an 
approach similar to that used in evaluating an agricultural extension 
project in which the benefits are recognised as a faster rate, and perhaps 
level, of adoption of a new technology. In both cases, the analyst must 
confront issues of attribution and of identifying a realistic technology 
adoption/policy reform scenario, including response lags. However, the 
causal links between a project and the outcomes sought seem far weaker in 
the case of policy research than in the case of traditional agricultural 
technologies, particularly in situations where there are many sources of 
policy research and advice. In the case of agricultural technologies, there 
is usually evidence that some farmers have found the technology 
profitable enough to warrant its adoption. This provides the analyst with 
some empirical basis for assumptions about the rate and extent of 
adoption. This is not the case for a single government policy-maker facing 
ever-changing economic and social conditions. Hence BCAs of  
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economic-policy research will often be more conjectural than those of 
agricultural technologies. 
 
Other evidence of the success of the ACIAR-
funded projects
 
The difficulties encountered in the empirical assessment described above 
mean that a final assessment of the value of these projects to China and 
ACIAR should be based on a broader range of criteria than a highly 
qualified empirical estimate of the potential benefits from efficiency gains 
in grain marketing in China. This broader set of criteria relates to project-
management processes, project outputs, extensions from the projects, and 
outcomes that are difficult to quantify, such as capacity-building. These 
other criteria are discussed in detail in the report and are briefly 
summarised here.
Key arguments for the success of the projects have been the strength of the 
Chinese partners and capacity-building within the Department of Policy 
Reform and Law in the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). The Chinese project 
leaders for the latest project were Mr Du Ying and Mr Tang Renjian from 
the Ministry of Agriculture. Mr Du is now Director General, Department of 
Rural Economy, State Development Planning Commission and Mr Ying is 
Director General, Office of Economics and Finance, Leading Group of the 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. Both are regarded as being 
influential in grain-marketing policy. The capacity of the Department of 
Policy Reform and Law to analyse policy and to conduct household surveys 
has probably been enhanced as a result of the research partnership. Policy 
analysis in MOA based on household surveys conducted during the project 
is claimed to have been influential in recent grain-marketing policy 
experiments in a number of provinces in the southeast of China. These 
claims were difficult to verify but were not disputed by most of the people 
interviewed. Earlier reviews of the projects commissioned by ACIAR 
commented on these issues and concluded that the projects were likely to 
influence grain-marketing policy in China.
The communications record of both projects is impressive. Outputs 
included a large number of research papers, some presented at 
professional conferences and some published in scientific journals and 
books. One book about grain marketing in China has been published and 
another is to be published soon. Research papers are available on a 
website, and findings and events reported in a project newsletter. Several 
significant workshops were also held in conjunction with the projects. 
These outputs are detailed in the report. 
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Project partners have been able to build on the success of the projects. 
Professor Zhong Funing from Nanjing Agricultural University has 
published a further 19 papers related to the project, and has attracted further 
financial support of A$54,000 from research funding institutions in China 
to continue his research into China’s comparative advantage in agriculture. 
Dr Christopher Findlay, the Australian project leader, was invited by the 
World Bank to be part of a team reviewing the Bank’s projects in China. 
His responsibility was the agricultural sector and he was able to apply some 
of the analysis from the ACIAR-funded projects to this review.  
The projects’ objective of measuring inter-regional grain flows within 
China was not met. Perhaps the continuing growth in the private grain-
trading sector, despite a hostile policy regime in the late 1990s, made it 
difficult if not impossible to meet this objective because accurate statistics 
on private grain trading were unlikely to be available.  
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Many people have helped in the conduct of this impact assessment. The 












The objective of this impact assessment is to undertake an economic 
analysis of the ACIAR-funded projects ANRE1/1992/028 ‘Emergence 
and integration of regional grain markets in China’ and ADP/1997/021 
‘Chinese grain market policy with special emphasis on the domestic grain 
trade’. Since decollectivisation in the late 1970s, the Chinese Government 
has been experimenting with a variety of policy instruments, such as 
production quotas, acquisition, support prices and buffer stocks, to 
minimise the costs of intervention in grain production and marketing 
while maintaining food security, a long-standing concern. However, the 
costs of intervention, both financial and economic, have been high, while 
concerns about food security have diminished.
The first project was led by Dr Chris Findlay, then of the University of 
Adelaide and by Guo Shutian, then of the Department of Policy Reform 
and Law in the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), China, and was conducted 
over the period 1993 to 1997. The objective of the project was ‘to analyse 
the origins and impacts of the development of an integrated national 
market for grain in China’. 
No doubt hoping to build on project ANRE1/1992/028, and to fill gaps 
particularly with respect to regional comparative advantage and trade 
flows, Findlay and a team from the Department of Policy Reform and Law 
in the MOA, China and from Nanjing Agricultural University undertook 
project ADP/1997/021 from 1999 to 2003. The objectives of project 














and evaluating current policy proposals including those that reduce 
the impediments to inter-regional trade.




to disaggregate China’s grain market, both in terms of types of grain 
(rice, wheat, maize) and major grain regions, in order to assess the 
impacts of integration of China’s grain markets on the types and  
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volumes of various grains transferred between regions within China 




to complement the study of the movements of grains between regions 





to undertake an economic and political analysis of how the economic 
forces operating on the market system are translated into policy 




to combine the results of that political economy analysis with a series 
of econometric projects on farm production processes and on the 
degree of market integration within and between regions of China.
The process of grain-market reform in China has been influenced on the 
one hand by a range of internal and external research and policy 
institutions, of which the ACIAR-funded projects (AFPs) are only a small 
part, and on the other, by a range of issues such as food security, income 
distribution and World Trade Organization (WTO) issues, of which grain 
market efficiency is but one. Perhaps concerns about food security and 
potential social unrest have been paramount concerns. 
In general terms, both projects aimed to demonstrate the likely 
inefficiencies associated with government intervention in grain marketing 
in China using empirical measures of comparative advantage, market 
integration and household income (from project surveys) to support a 
traditional analytical framework related to free markets. The relative 
influence of new information provided by the projects about this issue on 
the process of grain market reform in China is unclear and needs to be 
addressed in an economic impact assessment. The challenge is to isolate 
the AFPs’ contribution from these other influences on grain-market 
reform in China. 
ACIAR makes investments in agricultural research in developing 
countries as part of Australia’s development-assistance program. It has a 
strong tradition of empirical analysis of the impact of its activities, not 
only to strengthen its ability to meet accountability requirements to 
Australian taxpayers but also to assist in its internal processes of allocating 
and managing scarce research resources. These two projects were selected 
as part of the impact assessment process. They are the first ACIAR 
economic-policy projects to be evaluated . Previous evaluations have been 
of agricultural technology projects.  
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Many commentators remark on the difficulty of valuing social science 
research such as that under review here. Social science research is often an 
input to policy-making processes. There are manifold problems in 
attributing value to any particular piece of social science research where 
policy decisions are based on a wide variety of sources of information and 
other influences. Furthermore, there may be long lags between policy 
research and policy reform. Nevertheless, resources are devoted to social 
science research and it is important that these resources be used 
efficiently. 
In very general terms, the efficiency gains from grain-market reform can 
be thought of as reducing the social costs (or deadweight loss) associated 
with a price wedge in the form of a tax or a subsidy caused by government 
intervention in the market. The size of the deadweight loss depends on the 
size of the price wedge and on demand and supply elasticities. A review of 
the literature suggests that there is little agreement on any of these 
parameters and hence there must be great uncertainty about the extent of 
welfare gains to be had from reform in grain marketing in China.
The deadweight losses reflect the efficiency costs of market intervention. 
However, market intervention also has distributional or equity 
consequences. While households in China that are net consumers of grains 
are likely to benefit from greater market integration, the impact on rural 
households that produce grain is unclear. Many are likely to benefit, 
particularly in the longer term as they become free to produce more-
profitable crops, but some grain producers with few alternatives may be 
worse off. Those working in state-owned grain-marketing enterprises will 
be worse after the government withdraws. These issue are discussed 
further below.
While the extent of these efficiency costs does not appear to have been 
estimated by either the AFPs or other research institutions (with the 
possible exception of the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy), the 
contribution of the AFPs can perhaps be viewed as contributing to a 
growing recognition amongst policy-makers that these losses may be 
large, and hence to bringing forward the time when market reform is 
undertaken to reduce them.
Ultimately, it did not prove either practical or sensible to focus solely on a 
financial analysis of the two AFPs — for two reasons. First, there are 
many institutions involved in providing policy analysis and development 
related to grain marketing in China. There are no objective ways of 
attributing shares of the benefits from policy reform between these 
institutions. Nor were any of the academics and policy-makers  
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interviewed in the course of the assessment willing to make a judgment 
about the contribution of the AFPs to the rate of reform. Hence, an 
important part of the assessment process, briefly described below, has 
been to review qualitative factors related to the potential impact of the 
projects; such as their linkages with key policy-makers in China, their 
outputs in terms of papers and seminars, and any evidence of capacity-
building and subsequent recognition and financial support for research 
undertaken by the partners since completion of the projects. 
The second reason the financial analysis was difficult was that, in recent 
years, the extent of government intervention in grain marketing has 
expanded rather than contracted, and hence the benefits from grain-policy 
research — at least in terms of efficiency gains — have yet to be fully 
realised. It is highly probable that economic research will have some 
influence on grain-policy reform processes in China, but this influence 
may extend over many years. The challenge here has been to develop more 
specific paths to reform that are likely to be followed over the next few 
years — to develop ‘with policy research’ and ‘without policy research’ 
scenarios in the terminology of technology evaluation. The scenarios 
developed were based on a return by the end of 2004 to a similar degree of 
intervention in grain marketing to that prevailing in the mid 1990s. This 
scenario was developed after reviewing trends in the efficiency costs of 
intervention since 1980 and, indirectly, from discussions with academics 
and policy-makers in China.
This impact assessment was pursued:
1.  describing the outcomes of the AFPs
2.  valuing the potential benefits from grain market reform in China
3.  attempting to attribute some share of these potential benefits to the 
AFPs
4.  drawing these elements together into a benefit–cost analysis of 
ACIAR’s investments. 
The report proceeds as follows. Section 2 is a review of methodologies 
used in valuing economic research. Section 3 is a review of grain-market 
reform in China since the late 1980s. An attempt is made in Section 4 to 
estimate trends in social costs associated with grain-market intervention in 
China. Section 5 contains information about the objectives and outputs of 
the AFPs. In Section 6, views from academics and policy-makers in China 
about trends in grain market policy and about the role of the AFPs gained 21
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as part of this impact assessment are presented. Section 7 contains the 
benefit–cost analysis involving an estimate of the gains to China from 
grain-market reform and some hypothetical scenarios about the speed of 
reform and the role of the AFPs. Conclusions are given in Section 8.
2 Methodologies to evaluate the impact 
of the ACIAR–funded projects
There is a growing literature on the valuation of social science research. 
No attempt has been made to thoroughly review all this literature here but 
papers that have influenced the direction of this assessment include those 
by Ryan (1999), Gardner (1999), Schimmelpfennig and Norton (2003), 
and Lindner (1987). The International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) and the Government of The Netherlands sponsored a workshop on 
‘Impact assessment of policy oriented social science research’ in 2001 and 
some of these key papers were delivered at this workshop. 
Two methodological approaches have been employed to date. The first, 
based on Bayesian decision theory (BDT), values the information 
provided by research as the change in expected payoffs from policy 
actions where the likelihood of their occurrence has been revised as a 
result of the research. The second, referred to as the economic surplus 
approach, generally values research as the welfare gains from a faster rate 
of policy reform. They are reviewed in Appendix 1.
Both approaches have been applied in traditional evaluations related to 
agricultural technologies. The use of economic surplus techniques to 
evaluate agricultural technologies dates back at least to the analysis by 
Griliches (1958) of the returns from new corn varieties and is extensively 
reviewed in Alston et al. (1995). A common approach to evaluating 
extension programs has been to view extension as advancing the pace of 
adoption of a new technology. Some technologies focus on providing new 
information to farmers about, say, soil fertility, and BDT techniques have 
been applied to such problems (Anderson et al. 1977; Singh et al. 2002).
A widely held view seems to be that evaluating social science research is 
more difficult than valuing new technologies from biological research, 
largely because of attribution problems. Sumner (1997), for one, points to 
the similarities between these two areas, and suggests that the attribution 
problems in valuing biological research are sometimes taken for granted. 22
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However, it seems that cause and effect relationships are far less certain in 
the case of policy research than in a new production technology. 
Implications for assessing the ACIAR-funded 
projects
The economic surplus approach has been applied in this impact 
assessment, for two reasons. First, while trends in grain-marketing policy 
were discussed with Chinese academics and policy-development 
personnel from the Ministry of Agriculture, those who actually make 
grain-marketing policy in China were not able to be interviewed. This 
issue of access to policy-makers is a practical limitation on the use of the 
BDT approach, especially for relatively small projects. Perhaps this 
limitation can be eased by developing reasonable approaches to inferring 
how the relevant probabilities held by decision-makers change.
Second, grain-marketing policy in China is an area in which many 
institutions are competing, even if the eventual policy-makers are all 
domestic, and hence there is a problem of identifying the contribution of 
the AFPs. Unlike the economic surplus literature, there does not appear to 
have been a BDT application in which this issue of attribution has been 
worked through empirically and Schimmelpfennig and Norton (2003) 
were cautious about how successfully BDT could be applied. As will 
become clear below, this is not to say that the economic surplus approach 
has already developed objective procedures in such situations, but the 
issue has been addressed. 
3 Review of grain-market reform in 
China
This section identifies some of the key institutions that influence grain-
marketing policy in China, describes the pattern of grain-market reform 
since the 1980s, and reviews literature about the extent and rate of market 
integration in China. An understanding of the processes of grain-market 
reform in China is important in characterising the nature of market 
intervention and hence the estimation of welfare losses, and also in 
identifying the time path of market emergence and hence the ‘with-AFP’ 
and ‘without-AFP’ scenarios underlying the benefit–cost analysis that 
follows. 23
 IMPACT ASSESSMENT SERIES
  IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF ACIAR-FUNDED PROJECTS ON GRAIN-MARKET REFORM IN CHINA
3.1 Trends in grain production in China
Trends since 1980 in the production, price and value of rice, wheat, maize 
and soybean, the four largest grain crops in China, are shown in Table 1 
and Figures 1–3. These trends can be related to changes in intervention 
policy described in Section 3.3.
Figure 1 shows that, apart from more recent years, grain production in 
China has generally risen since 1980 — rice production by a third, while 
wheat and maize production has doubled. 
Nominal grain prices (Figure 2) rose substantially in the mid 1990s, 
encouraging production, and have since drifted down to be about three 
times their level in 1980. These are nominal average prices rather than real 
prices for over-quota production, which may explain why the relationship 
between prices and production, while consistent with expectations, may 
not be as strong as would be expected.
The real total value of production of the four grains (Figure 3) closely 
follows trends in nominal prices. The real value of production in 2001 was 
more than three times its value in 1980.
The decline in the value of production of these four grains from 1996 
reflects declines in the real price of grain which may have arisen in part 
because of difficulties encountered in implementing government policy at 
this time. Production fell in the three years from 1999. 
3.2 The agricultural policy-making process in China
Ultimately all policy, including grain-marketing policy, is decided by the 
now nine-member Politburo. The policy development process leading to 
this final decision-making body is carried out by the Central Leading Group 
for Rural Work, which is led by a vice premier in charge of agriculture and 
consists of ministers of agriculture, water resources, forestry, state 
development and reform commission, finance and commerce. These 
ministries have research groups including, for example, the Policy Research 
Office of the Central Party Committee, the Research Office of State 
Council, and policy-research departments in relevant ministries. There are 
also inputs  from research institutions, such as the Development Research 
Centre of State Council, the Research Center for Rural Economy in the 
MOA, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Other independent 
research organisations and universities conduct research that influences 
policy evaluation and development by the MOA. 24
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Figure 2.  Nominal grain prices for China25
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The AFPs are just two of many seeking to influence the rate and direction 
of grain-market reform in China. A listing of the groups involved in grain-
market research, which is probably incomplete, would include: the 
Department of Policy and Law, Ministry of Agriculture; the Center for 
Chinese Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Science; the Research 
Center for Rural Economy, Ministry of Agriculture; the College of 
Economics and Trade, Nanjing Agricultural University; the Institute of 
Agricultural Economics, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences; and 
the College of Economics and Management, China Agricultural 
University. Empirical research, or at least policy development, may also 
be occurring in the Development Research Center of State Council, the 
Macroeconomic Research Institute of the State Planning Committee; the 
Chinese Center for Economics Research, Beijing University; the Center 
for Rural Research, the Institute of Economic Research and the Institute of 
Population Studies in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and other 
universities. One interviewee suggested that the empirical and theoretical 
research was undertaken in the academies and at the universities and that 
policy development occurred in institutions more closely linked to policy 
processes, including some of the centres and within ministries. Some of 
the grain-marketing research in these centres has in the past been funded 
by external institutions such as the World Bank, the Ford Foundation and 
ACIAR, and this external funding may have provided critical extra 
resources to conduct surveys and collect and analyse data. 
The Policy and Law Department and the Research Center for Rural 
Economy within MOA were partners in the AFPs, as was the Nanjing 
Agricultural University. However, ACIAR has links, albeit indirect, with 
other parties in the policy streams, including the Central Leading Group 
for Rural Work.
3.3 Grain-market reform in China since the late 1980s
Several project papers review grain-market policy in China. These include 
papers by Findlay and Chen (1999), Watson and Findlay (1999) and 
Zhong (n.d.). Most of the papers review policy until the 1998 policy 
changes and argue for continuing market reform. Wang (n.d.) reviews the 
experiments introduced in 2000 in Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Guangdong 
provinces. These were extended to several other provinces in 2001. He 
argues that this experiment ‘symbolises the beginning of the marketisation 
of China’s grain economy’.
Zhong (n.d.) pointed out that the state grain-marketing system was 
established in the 1950s partly because of concerns about food security 27
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and the distribution of grain, and partly to allow economic surplus 
generated in agriculture to be used to promote development in other 
sectors of the economy.
Over the last two decades, grain-market policy in China has been marked by 
alternating periods of reform and retrenchment. The first period of reform, 
during which state control was relaxed, came between 1979 and 1992. This 
period started with the household responsibility system which referred to the 
responsibility of households to meet grain-production quotas. At the same 
time, grain-procurement prices were increased and private grain-trading 
emerged. Zhong (n.d.) noted that grain production increased at the rate of 
almost 5% per year between 1978 and 1984, and that rural incomes grew at 
an annual rate of almost 16% in real terms. The negative side of this was that 
budget expenditure on agriculture rose steeply.
In 1985, the mechanism by which the government acquired grain became 
less stringent. A consequence of the change noted by Zhong (n.d.) was that 
the price paid for over-quota grain was lower ,and grain production soon 
fell. This resulted in a return to a compulsory ‘state contract’ until 1993. 
Zhong noted that ‘Any step towards a more market-oriented direction 
depended on how comfortable the government felt with the actual and 
expected total supply, and how heavy was the budget burden to maintain 
the existing marketing system’. 
Zhong (n.d.) noted that the government substantially increased retail 
prices for rationed grain in 1991 and 1992, to the extent that they differed 
little from market prices and many local authorities abolished grain ration 
entitlements. While these charges were expected to lead to substantial 
budget savings, costs of operating the state-owned grain enterprises also 
seemed to rise. Zhong argued that all subsequent changes in grain-
marketing policy reflected a conflict between the government’s concern 
about food security and its wish to operate the state grain-marketing 
system more cost-effectively. 
By 1993, the domestic grain market was based on market operations, and 
inter-regional grain flows were increasing. Nonetheless, central and 
provincial governments still maintained a two-tier grain reserve system and 
farmers were still obliged to deliver a quota to state agencies although they 
were paid a market price. However, this was a time of both rapid inflation, 
reflected in high urban grain prices, and a fall in grain production. In 1994, 
there was a retrenchment from reform in the form of the ‘governor’s grain 
responsibility’ program which imposed on provincial governors 
responsibility for grain production and supply in their provinces, and 
required central government approval for price increases.28
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Declining production and increasing urban grain prices led some such as 
Lester Brown (Brown 1995) to doubt China’s food security. The 
government responded by doubling the price for quota grain between 1993 
and 1996. Grain production responded to a greater extent than expected 
but, for a variety of reasons, listed by Zhong (n.d.), grain consumption did 
not increase in this period, which meant that by the end of 1996 the market 
price for above-quota grain fell sharply and the government stepped in to 
protect it. The state grain agencies were required to purchase both quota 
and non-quota grain at prices above market levels — the price at which 
they could sell grain — and stockpiles and debts began to accumulate. 
Inefficiencies related to widespread underemployment in these agencies 
added to their financial problems.
It was hoped that this high level of grain production would encourage a 
return to grain-market reform but the ‘three policies and one reform’ 
program put into effect in 1998 strengthened the monopoly powers of the 
state grain agencies. Both quota and over-quota grain were to be 
purchased at a protection price. The program also required that the 
agencies sell grain at a price high enough to cover procurement prices and 
their costs, hence eliminating pressure on the government’s budget. It was 
hoped that grain could be sold at a price high enough to recoup the existing 
debts of the state grain agencies. 
The reviews of policy undertaken as part of the project were complemented 
by surveys of the impact of grain-market policy on farm households. Zhou 
and Zhong (n.d.) reported results from a survey of 201 households in a 
county in Jiangsu Province during 1996–2000. Huang Yanxin (n.d.) 
reported a survey of 1000 households in five provinces for the 1999–2000 
period. Both surveys found that the 1998 ‘three policies and one reform’ 
package had been largely ineffective in achieving its goals. 
One reason why the policy was ineffective was that the government could 
never ensure a complete monopoly. A private market continued, as farmers 
found it attractive to sell their over-quota grain to private traders, and hence 
the market price for grain between 1998 and 2000 never reached a level at 
which the state grain agencies could recover their operating costs and repay 
debts. Facing these difficulties, state grain agencies and provinces adopted 
policies that effectively circumvented the program. The agencies often 
downgraded the quality of grain to avoid paying the protection price and 
were reluctant to accept delivery of over-quota grain. Provinces cut quotas 
by as much as 24% according to Zhong (n.d.) and the central government 
announced that, from 1999, in some regions, spring wheat, red wheat, early 
Indica rice and maize were not subject to protection prices. Zhong pointed 
to the difficulty of attempting to act as a monopolist without controlling 29
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supply. The program was a burden to local governments and did not 
increase farm prices to the extent expected.
In reviewing this program at the final ACIAR workshop (7.9.01), Du Ying 
(2000) argued that the ‘three policies and one reform’ program had been 
constrained by the financial burdens associated with it. Hence, significant 
quantities of grain were still handled through private grain traders at 
market prices. He noted that China had moved to a position where it was 
generally self-sufficient in grains. Of significance was acceptance of the 
view that farmers did respond to grain prices in their production decisions 
because it provided a strong rationale to break away from what Lu Feng 
(1996) referred to as the ‘half circle’ reform model where policy 
retrenchment occurs when grain supplies become short (final seminar 
report; see Appendix 2). Some speakers at the seminar suggested that in 
the past, policy-makers had responded to the short-term impacts of market 
reform before long-run impacts could be observed. 
Zhong (n.d.) observed that, since 1997, grain production had remained 
high and farm prices low and he argued that this gave the government 
confidence that ‘food security will not be a problem in the foreseeable 
future’. In fact, in 2000, the government recognised a need for structural 
adjustment in agriculture towards higher-quality grains and the production 
of fruit and vegetables and animal products.
Despite the period of policy retrenchment since the mid 90s, there has 
continued to be a shift in grain production towards central and northern 
areas away from eastern coastal and western areas and increasing grain 
trade flows between these regions, which is consistent with the 
comparative advantage enjoyed by these regions. There has also been a 
continuing increase in the number of non-state grain-trading enterprises. 
The total area growing grain fell in the three years 1999–2001. Grain 
stocks have remained high, but because of a high proportion of 
undesirable varieties in the stockpile and because stocks are concentrated 
in the production areas, there is some concern at how effectively they 
might be used to smooth out the availability of grains through time across 
production and consumption provinces. The costs of these grains stocks 
have been very high (Wang n.d.).
In 2001, the government again began experimenting with market reform 
in a small number of provinces including Zhejiang, Gaungdong, Jiangsu, 
Shanghai, Hainan, Fujian, Beijing and Tianjin. According to Zhong (n.d.), 
grain marketing was to be completely free in these markets, with quotas 
and protection prices abolished and state grain agencies expected to 30
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become true business enterprises. Wang’s analysis of this latest 
experiment in reform focused on the provinces of Zhejiang, Guangdong 
and Jiangsu. There is little empirical analysis of this experiment in Wang’s 
undated paper and while the contribution of the AFPs to the experiment is 
not clearly described it is thought to have been influential. 
Wang (n.d.) argued that it was sensible to begin experiments in grain-
market reform in the coastal provinces, partly because of the extent of 
market reform in other sectors in these provinces and also because these 
provinces no longer had a comparative advantage in grain production and, 
indeed, are grain-deficit provinces. They produce 25% and 10% of 
China’s production of rice and wheat. In the three provinces, there are 
large numbers of grain-trading businesses. The government seems to have 
reserved the right to operate reserves to smooth out peaks and troughs in 
the market. Wang (n.d.) identified a number of other complementary 
measures designed to assist the market reform experiment. These included 
protection of farmland from non-agricultural development and a number 
of measures designed to allow the grain reserve system and state-owned 
grain market enterprises to function more efficiently. 
The accession of China to the WTO also has implications for grain-market 
reform. Under WTO, countries have to reduce the extent to which 
industries receive price supports related to production levels. Support of 
this nature in the grains industries can come only at the expense of such 
support elsewhere in the economy. It seems likely that accession to WTO 
has provided some impetus for China to once again examine grain-market 
policy reform, although as Du (2000) has pointed out, the level of 
protection to agriculture in China under green box provisions is low 
relative to many developed economies. The agricultural implications of 
WTO accession for China are discussed in a project paper by Du Ying 
(2000). Most of those interviewed in the course of this impact assessment 
suggested that, while WTO accession was influential, domestic 
considerations are likely to be of more significance in determining the 
future course of grain-market reform in China. The impact of WTO 
accession is the subject of another, ongoing AFP (ADP/1998/128).
3.4 Evidence of the integration of grain markets in 
China
As markets become more liberalised, trade flows and production patterns 
would be expected to change in ways consistent with principles of 
comparative advantage, and differences in grain prices between provinces 
would be expected to reflect mainly transport costs rather than trade 31
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barriers. There is some dissension among China ‘experts’ about the impact 
of this period of policy reform and retrenchment on the degree of 
integration of grain markets in China. Evidence from research conducted 
by the AFPs and from other sources is briefly reviewed below. 
Du Ying (2000) reported that, since the mid 1980s, regional grain flows had 
changed in accord with regional comparative advantage. In particular, 
grain was flowing from north to south, the volume of trade has been 
increasing and new patterns of inter-regional trade were emerging. Similar 
conclusions can be found in other project papers by Chen and Findlay 
(2001), Wang Zhonghai et al. (2001). However, there is an expectation that 
China does not have a comparative advantage in the production of at least 
some grains such as wheat and maize (Du Ying 2000; Carter et al. 1996; 
Zhang 2000) and hence that more grain will be imported, especially by 
coastal provinces and large cities as access to world markets is liberalised. 
There were, however, some misgivings about these findings. While the 
domestic resource cost (DRC) methodology can be used to indicate 
comparative advantage in grain production at a province level, several 
speakers at the final seminar (Findlay 2001) noted the importance of using 
the true shadow prices for inputs such as land and water (rather than 
administered prices) and also that the cost of transport between provinces 
needs to be accounted for. In this more pessimistic vein, Carter and 
Lohmar (2002) using an index of regional specialisation suggested by 
Krugman (1991) found that the degree of regional specialisation showed 
little trend from 1981 to 1993, but during the period of policy 
retrenchment from 1994–1999 the index has drifted down from 54% in 
1981 to 45.5% in 1999. Others to draw similar conclusions about 
unrealised opportunities to gain from comparative advantage include Du 
(2000), Young (2000) and Fang and Beghin (2001). Using the DRC 
approach, project team members, Zhong et al. (n.d.) found that China is 
likely to have ‘a strong comparative advantage in Japonica rice, sorghum, 
middle Indica rice, millet and late Indica rice production’ but that there 
remains ‘great potential to improve resource allocation and to increase 
grain production through restructuring of the grain sector’. Zhong and Xu 
(n.d.) in a project paper found that regional comparative advantage had yet 
to be fully exploited in China. 
In addition to these studies analysing trends in comparative advantage and 
regional specialisation, members of the project team also conducted 
econometric analyses of price integration both between domestic markets 
and between domestic and international markets. Wu Laping (n.d.), for 
example, found in several papers that while there was evidence of 
integration in the long run, this was not the case in the short run and he 32
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called for continued market reform. Du Yang (2001) reached similar 
conclusions. Wang Xiaolu (n.d.) argued that government intervention in 
grain markets had been too unresponsive to underlying trends to smooth 
out prices and production as intended, and that the way forward lay in a 
smaller role for government. Zhong and Zhu (n.d.) argued that a more 
integrated grain market would significantly lower the cost of meeting 
food-security reserves. They estimated that required storage capacity 
could be reduced from 320 million tonnes to 82 million tonnes and the 
average amount of grain stored reduced by more than 119 million tonnes if 
the markets were integrated at a national level, although market 
integration requires investment in transport infrastructure. 
In contrast, several studies have argued that market integration has 
continued despite periods of policy retrenchment. In an analysis of the 
impact of WTO accession on agriculture in China, Huang et al. (2004) 
found evidence that agricultural markets throughout China were integrated. 
Park et al. (2002) attempted a more comprehensive analysis of the extent of 
development in grain markets in China. They argued that despite recurring 
periods of policy retrenchment, grain markets had continued to evolve, 
although at an uneven pace, because policy instruments to regulate prices, 
production and trade were becoming less effective and more expensive. A 
constraint to market development, particularly in southern China, is a lag in 
the development of transport infrastructure which may explain some of the 
increases in transactions costs. 
Park et al. (2002) argued that tests of market integration based on the co-
movement in prices in ‘neighbouring’ markets, which generally found a 
lack of integration, were unable to determine whether the lack of 
integration was due to failed arbitrage, autarky or trade flow switches. 
They defined autarky to be a situation where the price difference between 
markets is less than the transaction cost between the markets and failed 
arbitrage as where the price difference is greater than the transaction cost.
They used a data set on market prices for rice and maize collected by the 
National Market Administration Bureau from 180 sites in 28 provinces. 
This provided reports every 10 days for the period 1988 to 1995. They 
estimated a parity bounds model of inter-regional trade using maximum 
likelihood techniques. The observation period was split into four sub-
periods; two approximating periods of policy liberalisation and two 
approximating periods of retrenchment. They examined how arbitrage and 
autarky rates and transactions costs (estimated from the data) varied over 
these sub-periods. 33
 IMPACT ASSESSMENT SERIES
  IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF ACIAR-FUNDED PROJECTS ON GRAIN-MARKET REFORM IN CHINA
The empirical results of Park et al. (2002) provide mixed evidence about 
the extent of market development. It is certain that the rate of market 
development as measured by some of their three parameters slowed down 
in some of the periods of retrenchment. However, they went on to argue 
that, based on other knowledge about grain markets in China and 
infrastructure problems, markets had continued to grow as measured by the 
number of traders and the volume of trade, and that trade barriers were only 
one factor influencing the growth of integrated grain markets in China. 
This uncertainty about the degree of integration in grain markets in China 
is also reflected in uncertainty about the degree of protection at the border 
afforded to grain industries, and hence about the impact on China of 
accession to the WTO. The level of border protection was analysed by 
Huang et al. (2004). They pointed to divergent views about the impact of 
the WTO on China. Carter and Li (1999) and Du Ying (2000) in a project 
paper, argued that accession to the WTO would have a significant impact 
on the structure of the grains industries in China. Other papers in this vein 
include those by Carter and Estrin (2001), Li et al. (1999) and Anderson 
and Peng (1998). 
Huang and Chen (1999) used a multi-commodity econometric model of 
China’s food demand, supply and trade, known as the China Agricultural 
Policy Simulation and Projection Model (CAPSiM), to empirically 
estimate the impact on the agricultural sector in China of trade 
liberalisation associated with accession to the WTO. They found that ‘in 
general, China’s agriculture would face great challenges and shocks from 
trade liberalization’ and projected that land-intensive crops such as wheat 
and maize would contract within China and that, at least initially, imports 
of these commodities would rise, but that rice and horticulture and 
intensive animal products would expand and be exported. China’s rate of 
self-sufficiency in grain production might decline to 90% by 2005 and in 
the order of 2 to 2.5 million personyears of labour might be released from 
agriculture. For the agricultural sector as a whole, the welfare gains from 
trade liberalisation were likely to be small, but within the sector there 
would be clear winners and losers.
In an attempt to inject more empirical evidence to the debate, Huang et al. 
(2004) used the same (but updated) data source as Park et al. (2002) to first 
measure border protection rates for a range of commodities as a measure 
of the distortion to be removed by WTO accession and then analysed how 
this ‘border shock’ would be transmitted throughout the country. They 
derived their estimates from surveys of around 100 grain-market 
participants in nine major trading centres (mostly port cities). Huang et al. 
(2003b) pointed to the difficulty of estimating net protection rates (NPRs – 34
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the difference between domestic and world prices) as a single number for a 
range of crops, varying in quality, and sold in a host of markets throughout 
China all through the year. A lack of uniformity in methodology explains 
the variation in estimates of NPRs evident in the literature referred to 
above. This question of border protection is reviewed thoroughly here 
because the rate of border protection is later used as the basis for 
estimating the gains from grain-market reform.
Huang, Rozelle and Chang (2003) found that for a grain like wheat the 
effective level of protection varied widely depending in part on the quality 
of wheat. Hence, the level of protection for high-quality North American 
wheat might be as high as 50% but the market for such wheat was very 
small. The protection on medium-quality wheats (by international 
standards), accounting for about 15% of the market, was about 10%. The 
level of protection for lower-quality wheats accounting for about 60% of 
the market was around 8%. Huang, Rozelle and Chang  (2003) estimated 
an aggregate set of NPRs by weighting the NPRs for particular grain 
qualities by their sown areas.
Huang, Rozelle and Chang (2003) estimated that, in October 2001, the 
average NPRs across China for wheat, rice, maize and soybeans were 12, 
–3, 32 and 15% but warned that there was great variation by locality and 
quality for these commodities. In contrast, they suggested that had NPRs 
been estimated in the usual way, the NPR for wheat would have been 
–21% and that for rice –48%, suggesting that these grains were being 
taxed rather than protected.
They found that while protection had sometimes been high up to the early 
1980s, it has since fallen, to the extent that, around the turn of the century, 
protection for rice was negative, that for wheat and maize was around 30% 
and that for soybeans was less than 20% (Table 2). They went on to argue 
that rural exports had switched towards labour-intensive horticultural and 
animal products away from land-intensive grains as expected under 
comparative advantage. They did point out that in some cases China now 
relied on other non-traditional mechanisms for trade protection, such as its 
taxation system.
NPRs measure protection at the border. The impact on China’s farmers of, 
say, the WTO, depends not only on the size of the price shock at the border 
but also on how the price shock flows through to markets far from the 
borders. Huang, Rozelle and Xie 2003), while pointing out that the 
transmission of such a price shock depends on whether there are other 
policy safeguards, on the extent to which households can change 
enterprise mix in response to relative prices changes and the nature of 35
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transactions costs between markets, focused on analysing the latter — the 
level of integration between markets – revisiting the work of Park et al. 
(2002). They found that grain markets in China were integrated to some 
degree and hence that specialised grain growers, even in remote markets, 
will not be isolated from changes in market prices in coastal provinces.
While their research findings were generally in accord with the trends 
identified by Huang, Rozelle and Xie (2003), Tian et al. (2002) have 
suggested that traditional means of computing net protection rates as the 
difference between a border and a market price overstate the degree of 
protection afforded Chinese farmers because of the high level of 
agricultural products that are consumed on the farm rather than marketed. 
3.5 Measures of the welfare gains from grain-market 
reform in China
The importance to an impact assessment of the AFPs on grain-market 
reform of being able to estimate the potential benefits from grain market 
reform has already been noted. The only paper known to the author that 
attempts to value grain-market policy reform is that by de Brauw et al. 
(2000). They compared the gains from decollectivisation under the 
household responsibility system from 1975 to 1984 with the gains from 
market liberalisation from 1985 to 1995. They conducted an econometric 
analysis of the returns to land and labour at a provincial level for 13 
Table 2.  Changes in nominal rates of protection over time of China’s major agricultural commodities, 
1978 to 2000a
Nominal rates of protection (%)
Rice Wheat Maize Soybean
1978–79 10 89 92 40
1980–84 9 58 46 44
1985–89 –4 52 37 39
1990–94 –7 30 12 26
1995–97 –1 19 20 19
1998–00 –6 26 32 49
1998 –6 22 40 37
1999 –9 30 33 67
2000 –2 26 23 44
2001 –3 12 32 15
a Nominal rates of protection (NPRs) measured as difference (in percentage terms) between 
average border price and average domestic wholesale (market) price.
Source:  Huang et al. (2004).36
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provinces in northern China for the period 1975 to 1995. They found that 
the gains from market liberalisation, at around 1% per year of the return to 
labour and land, were modest compared with the returns to 
decollectivisation. They qualified this conclusion by pointing to some 
methodological issues but, more importantly, argued that the gains from 
market liberalisation are slower to eventuate, that the process of market 
liberalisation was incomplete and that they had not attempted to estimate 
the benefits from grain market liberalisation to others in the community. 
4 Potential welfare gains from grain-
market reform
4.1 Characterising intervention in grain markets
As already noted, there do not appear to have been any empirical studies to 
estimate the potential gains from grain-market reform in China. While the 
resources available to conduct this impact assessment do not permit a 
thorough empirical analysis, it is necessary to make an approximate 
estimate of the potential gains from grain-market reform. In the first 
instance, this requires a crude characterisation of the grain policy in China 
at a national level, ignoring the regional differences that most 
commentators point to.
It is assumed that, at least for wheat, maize and soybean, the government 
has generally intervened in these markets to provide price support to 
growers, but has also required producers to meet production quotas. This 
intervention in the domestic market has been made possible by border 
protection measures. 
Attention has been confined to estimating the total social costs or 
deadweight losses of market intervention. Several combinations of 
policies can be used to arrive at the observed price and quantity outcomes 
(as discussed in Alston and James (2002)), but because at this stage there 
is less concern about apportioning gains and losses to consumers, 
producers and taxpayers, there is no attempt to represent the actual 
policies used for any commodity, just the final outcomes. One drawback 
of this approach is that, as discussed in Alston and James (2002), the 
marginal excess burden of taxation to finance market intervention will 
vary depending on the extent to which the policy combination relies on 
taxation. 37
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Following Alston and James (2002) closely, the impact of removing a 
grain subsidy of say, τ (% of final price) is to reduce the price to farmers 
from P1 to P0 in Figure 4 with an accompanying fall in domestic 
production from Q1 to Q0. Producer surplus falls by the area A + B. 
Consumer surplus (if grain under interventions had been sold at price P2 to 
avoid stockpiles) falls by area C + D. The gain to government is the area 
A + B + C + D + E, and hence the deadweight loss, the net welfare gain to 
China, is the area E. 
The extent of the deadweight loss for the removal of a subsidy can be 
estimated using linear approximations of supply and demand from the 
following formula adapted from Alston and James (2002):
where τP1 is the reduction in farm price, ε is the supply elasticity, and η is 
the absolute value of the demand elasticity at equilibrium. The social gain 
from the policy increases with the size of the industry (PQ), and the size of 
the price wedge associated with that change. Hence, the deadweight loss 
can vary with production and price, irrespective of the price wedge.
In the case of rice, the results of the empirical work of Huang, Rozelle and 
Chang (2003) suggest that, at times, the price farmers received for rice has 
been below the border price, at say P2 in Figure 4, and that this has been 
maintained by restrictions on exports. Farmers have also been required to 
supply Q1 to the marketing authorities. The impact of removing this set of 
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would lose the area C + D but producers would gain surplus amounting to 
C + D + E, where D + E is the amount by which the cost of producing 
production from Q2 to Q1 exceeds the price received. The net gain to the 
community from removing this combination of policies is again area E, 
which is estimated using Equation 1. 
4.2 Parameterising the model of welfare gains from 
grain market reform
Potential welfare gains from grain market reform can be estimated by 
parameterising Equation 1. The size of the potential welfare gains are 
largely driven by the extent of the price wedge, τ, and the value of the 
industry at the initial ‘equilibrium’, P1Q1. Huang (assisted by Qui 
Huanguang) provided data on price and production data (Table 1) since 
1980. Attention is focused on the four crops for which Huang, Rozelle and 
Chang (2003) provided estimates of protection rates — rice, wheat, maize 
and soybean. Huang and Chen (1999) noted that rice, wheat and maize 
account for more than 80% of total grain production in China. 
Arguably the most critical choice in this assessment has been to use the 
estimates by Huang, Rozelle and Chang (2003) of nominal protection 
rates as a measure of the price wedge, τ, and of the impact of government 
intervention. The uncertainties attached to the measurement of this 
parameter, which have resulted in wide divergences in its value, were 
noted earlier. Border protection measures are required to support domestic 
market intervention. However, nominal protection rates, measured as the 
difference between prices in world and local markets, pick up more that 
just the impact of government intervention. They may reflect other causes 
of inefficiency related to transport for example. 
In the financial analysis that follows, the focus is on the change in the price 
wedge under two scenarios about the extent of government intervention 
and on the change in deadweight loss (rather than the absolute value of the 
deadweight loss). Assuming that over short periods these other influences 
picked up by the NPRs are constant, this differencing procedure  makes 
the use of changes in NPRs a more reliable proxy for the change in the 
price wedge.
The other parameters are the elasticities of supply and demand in these 
industries. The study by Huang and Chen (1999) using the CAPSiM 
model to assess the effects of trade liberalisation on agriculture in China is 
the basis of the estimates of supply and demand elasticities used in this 
impact assessment. The model was estimated as a system for 12 crop and 7 39
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livestock products and 5 inputs including research and irrigation stocks. 
From the report accessed it is unclear how many years of data were used to 
estimate the model.
The crop response was estimated as a two-stage process with areas and 
yield response components in double log form. These elasticities, for 
1996, as well as demand elasticities for urban and rural consumers, are 
presented in Table 3. Supply elasticities were derived by adding the area 
and yield elasticities. Presumably as a result of more recent work, J. Huang 
(pers. comm.) has suggested a slightly larger set of elasticities, also 
presented in Table 3, and these will be used in the baseline estimates of 
welfare changes below. In general, they are consistent with 
preconceptions that supply is likely to be more elastic than demand, and 
elasticities are likely to be larger in absolute terms for the smaller crops.
Expectations about how grain producers in China respond to price changes 
may have been a key policy driver in China, perhaps reflecting concern 
about rural poverty and food security. It is certainly influential in 
assessments of the costs of market intervention. If supply elasticities are 
double those used here (Table 3), then, as explained more fully below, the 
estimate of the average annual cost of increased market intervention since 
1998 increases by one third to about 2000 m yuan. As noted later, 
benefit–cost ratios also go up by about one third under this scenario. Two 
interesting dimensions to this issue of supply response are first, de Brauw 
et al. (2000) found some evidence that grain supply has become more 
responsive to price as markets have been liberalised, and second, 
economic policy research may have contributed to a view amongst policy 
makers that farmers were more responsive to price signals than previously 
thought and this may advance the pace of reform.
Table 3.  Crop supply and demand elasticities

















Rice 0.18 0.10 0.28 –0.29 –0.20 0.45 –0.25
Wheat 0.25 0.14 0.39 –0.28 –0.25 0.45 –0.30
Maize 0.26 0.14 0.40 –0.25 –0.28 0.60 –0.25
Soybean 0.26 0.07 0.33 –0.30 –0.25  0.55 –0.3040
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4.3 Trends in the welfare costs of intervention in grain 
markets
Trends in the welfare costs of intervention in grain markets were of interest 
for two reasons. The first, already mentioned, was to provide an empirical 
estimate of the welfare cost of intervention in the benefit–cost analysis that 
follows. The second, and related reason, was to help define the ‘with’ and 
‘without’ scenarios in the analysis of the AFPs, by reviewing trends in 
welfare costs as policy has evolved since 1980. The uncertainty attached to 
the raw estimates of welfare costs used in this assessment suggests that it 
would be unwise to base the analysis on a couple of recent years. 
The net protection rates provided by Huang, Rozelle and Chang (2003) were 
averages over 3- and 4-year periods since 1980.1 The average was simply 
assigned to each year over which it was calculated. The estimates in Table 2 
suggest that, in general, nominal protection rates declined until the 1998–2000 
period. This is generally consistent with the review of policy above, although 
the key policy changes that resulted in marked rises in domestic prices 
occurred in the mid-1990s. To gain further insights into the general trend in 
protection, an average nominal protection rate across the four grains was 
derived by weighting the individual protection rates by their shares in the total 
value of production of the four grains. This average series is presented in 
Table 4. This series declined at a rate of about 9.5% per year until 1998.
An estimate was made of the deadweight losses for each of the four grains for 
each year since 1980, using the one set of elasticity estimates (Huang’s 
preferred set), the estimates of NPRs from Table 2, and Equation 1. Using 
these parameters, the social cost to China of intervention in the grain market in 
2001 may have been in the order of 12.9m yuan, 127.8m yuan, 996.6m yuan 
and 65.1m yuan in the rice, wheat, maize and soybean industries, or 1202.4m 
yuan in total. The large social costs associated with the maize industry are 
driven by the much larger difference between the domestic and border price 
for maize — 32% — as compared with the other grains. Since these grains are 
likely to be substitutes in both production and consumption, estimates of the 
welfare changes for individual grains are likely to be unreliable and, from here 
on, attention is therefore focused on the total welfare change. 
As already noted above, not all these social costs can be captured by the 
government simply withdrawing from grain marketing. The lack of 
transport infrastructure in particular has been mentioned as a continuing 
source of inefficiency.
1 The estimates for 1978–79 were not included because price and production data for 
these years were not available.41
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The 1980–2001 series of total real deadweight losses can be found in Table 
4 and Figure 5. There is little apparent trend in this series. This is perhaps not 
unexpected because the estimate of deadweight loss depends on the value of 
production, which varies from year to year independently of policy. It also 
depends on the nominal rate of protection, the price wedge, which also has 
an exogenous element in it, in the form of world market prices. 
In an attempt to ‘smooth out’ this series, the estimate of total deadweight 
loss was expressed as a ratio of the total value of production of the four 
grains (Table 4 and Figure 6). This relative series gives a clearer picture of 
the trend in protection of the four grains in China since 1980. From 1984 to 
1998 the level of protection fell steadily (at a rate of about 14% per year) 
but has since risen. These trends are consistent with the review of grain-
marketing policy presented earlier. 
Table 4. Trends in the costs of China’s Intervention in grain markets
Average NPRa








1980 0.31 948 75,044 0.013
1981 0.31 1,008 76,857 0.013
1982 0.31 1,102 84,420 0.013
1983 0.32 1,273 92,594 0.014
1984 0.32 1,767 129,243 0.014
1985 0.22 1,335 131,304 0.010
1986 0.23 1,552 148,334 0.010
1987 0.21 1,479 157,610 0.009
1988 0.21 1,970 208,536 0.009
1989 0.20 2,456 261,797 0.009
1990 0.08 698 236,771 0.003
1991 0.08 650 222,071 0.003
1992 0.09 780 247,863 0.003
1993 0.09 1,043 347,637 0.003
1994 0.08 1,691 608,270 0.003
1995 0.10 1,347 743,243 0.002
1996 0.10 1,325 728,064 0.002
1997 0.10 1,148 622,347 0.002
1998 0.15 3,131 578,855 0.005
1999 0.15 3,486 490,832 0.007
2000 0.13 1,622 420,685 0.004
2001 0.11 1,202 417,317 0.00342
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During much of the 1990s, the deadweight losses from market 
intervention were around 0.2–0.3% of the value of production of the four 
grains. However, in the late 1990s this percentage increased to a peak of 
0.7%, presumably reflecting the policy retrenchment that occurred in the 
last half of that decade.
The trend in this ratio of welfare costs to the value of production suggests that 
an approximation of the cost of policy retrenchment over the years 1998 to 
2001 may be the difference between the actual deadweight losses in these 
years (estimated using Equation 1), the column in Table 5 headed ‘Real 
deadweight loss’, and the deadweight losses where protection rates were 















































































































































































































Figure 6.  Ratio of total deadweight loss to the total value of production of four grains in China43
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production of the four grains over this period — the column in Table 5 
headed ‘Real deadweight loss at 0.2% of the  total value of production’.2 The 
average difference in deadweight losses over the four years was 1484 m yuan 
and is the basis for defining the hypothetical ‘with policy research’ and 
‘without policy research’ in the financial analysis below. 
In terms of Figure 4, the ‘Real deadweight loss’ column is an estimate of 
the area E, the gains from a total elimination of market intervention 
measured from point M, the existing price and quantity combination. The 
deadweight losses constrained to 0.2% of the value of production are an 
approximation of a triangle (in Figure 4) similar to E (and contained 
within E, with a vertex at the intersection of demand and supply) but with a 
smaller price wedge (although these losses were not estimated using 
Equation 1). The difference in these two triangles is a parallelogram 
within area E. 
It was noted above that area E may pick up sources of market inefficiency 
other than government intervention. If these other sources of inefficiency 
remained constant over the period between 1998 and 2001, then the 
average difference in deadweight losses of 1484m yuan is an estimate of 
the annual costs of policy retrenchment over this period.
4.4 Qualifying this approach to estimating potential 
welfare gains
There are a number of reasons confidence intervals around these estimates 
of potential welfare gains are likely to be wide. First. they are based on a 
model of a national market. Many commentators, including Huang et al. 
(2003b), have pointed out that there is great variation across China in all 
2  Not requiring the use of Equation 1.
Table 5.  Welfare costs of two market intervention scenarios











1998 0.5 3,131 1,068 2,064
1999 0.7 3,486 905 2,581
2000 0.4 1,621 763 859
2001 0.3 1,202 770 433
Average difference in DWL  1,484
a Deadweight loss
b Total value of production44
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dimensions of this issue, which in practical terms means that the 
parameters in Equation 1 will vary across the country. Resources 
permitting, an alternative approach would have been to disaggregate 
Figure 4 and Equation 1 to a model of spatially linked markets in key areas 
of grain production and consumption.
Another major area of uncertainty pointed to by Huang et al. (2003b) is 
that there seems little agreement about the extent of border protection for 
the grain industries examined. This issue was reviewed earlier. 
A similar level of uncertainty surrounds the estimates of demand and 
supply elasticities used above. If supply elasticities are double those used 
here (Table 3), then the estimate of the average annul cost of increased 
market intervention since 1998 increases by one third, to about 2000m 
yuan. As will be noted later, BCRs also go up by about one-third under this 
scenario.
Two interesting dimensions to this issue of supply response are first that 
de Brauw et al. (2000) found some evidence that grain supply has become 
more responsive to price as markets have been liberalised, and second, as 
noted above, economic-policy research may have contributed to a view 
amongst policy-makers that farmers were more responsive to price signals 
than previously thought and this may advance the pace of reform. 
The four grain industries have been modelled as being independent of each 
other, whereas in reality there is likely to be some degree of joint 
production in these industries. Similarly, these grains are likely to be 
substitutes in consumption to some degree. Of greater significance is the 
fact that the opportunity for farmers to move from grains with production 
quotas to other more profitable crops has not been explicitly modelled. 
Consumers are also likely to gain from such a shift in resources. Huang et 
al. (2003a) noted that quite large shifts between enterprises may occur in 
response to trade liberalisation. The approach used here may therefore 
result in a significant underestimate of the costs of the greater intervention 
in recent years. 
As noted by Huang et al. (2003b), another reason for the lack of 
integration between prices for grains across China is related to 
infrastructure issues such as transport. Hence, the approach used here may 
bias the estimate of the potential gains from market reform if the costs 
imposed by transport infrastructure are severe and have changed 
significantly during the late 1990s.45
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There are thus a number of potential sources of bias in estimating the 
welfare costs associated with greater market intervention since 1998. 
Largely because the opportunity for farmers constrained by production 
quotas to move to more profitable crops was not explicitly modelled, the 
likelihood is that welfare costs of about 1500m yuan understate the true 
costs of recent intervention. In the financial analysis that follows, a 
scenario in which these costs are doubled to 3000m yuan was examined.
5 The ACIAR-funded grain market 
reform projects
The AFPs are just two of many such projects seeking to influence the rate 
and direction of grain-market reform in China. A list of the groups 
involved in grain-market research was provided in Section 3.2. 
It has not been possible to quantitatively attribute shares in the potential 
gains from policy reform between these manifold sources of policy 
research and development. However, an attempt was made, by reviewing 
project reports and interviewing those knowledgeable about grain-
marketing policy in China, including past reviewers of the projects, to 
qualitatively assess whether the AFPs made a positive contribution to the 
larger body of economic research into grain-marketing policy in China. 
This has been done by briefly noting the outputs of the projects and then 
identifying the means by which the projects may have been influential.
5.1 Project outputs
Important outputs were surveys of 1000 households for the years 
1999–2001 and the development of a database for these surveys and those 
from 1994–96 from the earlier project. These surveys provided 
information on the production and marketing of grain by rural households 
which was used to assess the effectiveness of existing policy. 
Both projects have impressive publications records (see Appendix 2). 
From project ANRE1/1992/028, about 70 research articles and conference 
papers were prepared, some of which appeared in Findlay and Watson 
(1998). As part of the project, a conference was held at the East West 
Center in Hawaii in 1995 deliberations at which are likely to have 
influenced the direction of economic research about grain marketing in 
China.46
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From project ADP/1997/021, there was a series of 29 research reports, 
describing the research findings of the projects. Some of these papers were 
delivered at professional conferences and a selection of 15 of them will 
appear in a collection of readings entitled ‘China’s domestic grain 
marketing reform and integration’, edited by Findlay and Chen and to be 
published by Asia Pacific Press in 2004. Professor Zhong Funing from 
Nanjing Agricultural University is an author on a further 19 papers arising 
from the project and published in journals or books.
Research findings from the project were reported in an electronic 
newsletter which was issued five times between February 2000 and 
September 2001, and were also communicated at a series of workshops 
held May 2000, and in June and September 2001. The workshops were 
attended by key policy-makers and grain-marketing policy experts as well 
as project team members. Project members organised two sessions at the 
45th annual conference of the Australian Agricultural and Resource 
Economics Society in Adelaide in January 2001. A Chinese delegation 
visited Australia in November 2000 and Chinese team members visited at 
various times in the course of the project. 
5.2 Other activities emerging from projects
Since completion of project ADP/1997/021, team members have engaged 
in other activities that have arisen, in part, from the success of these AFPs. 
Professor Zhong Funing, for example, has been successful in obtaining 
funding amounting to about A$54,000 from the National Science Fund, 
the Ministry of Education, and the US–China Academy Exchange 
Program, for three projects to continue his empirical research into China’s 
comparative advantage in agriculture. Professor Findlay was invited by 
the World Bank to be part of a team reviewing the Bank’s projects in 
China. His responsibility was the agricultural sector and he was able to 
apply some of the analysis from the AFPs to this review.  
5.3 Project findings
The findings of many of the research papers were discussed in the review 
of grain marketing above. This section briefly summarises findings related 
to key project objectives. In general, the research supports the initial 
premise that government intervention in grain marketing in China has 
been costly and ineffective, and that government’s objectives with respect 
to integrated, efficient and stable grain markets across the country can best 
be met by continued market reform.47
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With respect to inter-regional trade, the project found that regional grain 
trade has been increasing in a direction consistent with regional 
comparative advantage. With respect to regional comparative advantage, 
the project found that there was still scope to restructure the regional 
pattern of production in response to market pressures and that some 
regions, because of their resource endowments, would emerge as being 
competitive in the production of particular crops. With respect to market 
integration, the project found that, while markets were integrated in the 
long run, government intervention has meant that price transmission in the 
short run between markets has been slow, and domestic prices have 
diverged in both directions from world prices. With respect to grain-
marketing policy and farmers’ behaviour, the project found that attempts 
to acquire grain at support prices have not been successful. Hence, the 
private sector role in grain trading has continued to grow even in periods 
of policy retrenchment. A key message from the project was that farm 
production decisions were responsive to grain prices. With respect to the 
experiments in grain marketing begun in 2001 in Zhejiang Province, it was 
argued from project results that market development had accelerated, and 
that grain trade and production was altering in directions suggested by 
comparative advantage. With respect to grain-market fluctuations and 
government intervention, research from the project suggested that 
government intervention had not contributed to smoothing out variation in 
grain prices and outputs, and that grain market reform should therefore 
continue. 
5.4 Project influence
The path and extent to which the research outputs of the projects 
influenced policymakers in China is unclear and is an important issue to be 
investigated in this impact assessment. The project team suggested in its 
second annual report that:
…the above research findings have directly and indirectly produced 
significant benefits which have been delivered through project seminars, 
conferences and publications. Academic researchers, policy makers and 
government officials through these activities have had opportunities to 
discuss and consider the implications of China’s ongoing grain marketing 
reform.
Empirical and definitive evidence to support the claim of the project team 
is difficult, if not impossible, to assemble. The project was conducted at a 
time when, as often as not, policy retrenchment rather than reform was 
occurring. In addition, the ACIAR-funded team was only one of a number 48
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of domestic and international research and policy institutions 
recommending market reform. 
Nevertheless, both project reviews (commissioned by ACIAR) were 
highly complimentary of the projects. The review team for 
ANRE1/1992/028 found that: 
…this project has been an outstanding success in terms of its 
achievements. For the sums of money involved, there can be few other 
projects which have not only produced so much high quality tangible 
output, but also made important contributions to research capacity 
building in both China and Australia, and at the same time helped lay the 
foundations for possible policy changes which potentially could generate 
huge gains from trade for China, for Australia, and for the rest of the world. 
In reviewing ADP/1997/021, Carter and Cai (2001) concluded that, while 
the project had not delivered a proposed matrix of regional grain flows, ‘it 
is not an exaggeration to suggest that this project may very well influence 
government grain policy in China’. This influence on future policy has 
been achieved through research into the integration of provincial grain 
markets; analyses of trade flows and barriers between provinces; analyses 
of comparative advantage by province; and more-qualitative work 
explaining the outcomes of existing market policies and potential policy 
reforms backed up by the 1000-household survey data demonstrating the 
impact of these policies on households. 
This research is likely to have had a positive impact on policy-making 
because of the strong links between the research staff engaged in the 
project from Australia, the Ministry of Agriculture and Nanjing 
Agricultural University and key policy-makers within the MOA who 
regularly attended project workshops and seminars held in China and 
Australia. The Chinese project leaders from the Ministry of Agriculture 
for the latest project were Mr Du Ying and Mr Tang Renjian. These men 
are now Director General, Department of Rural Economy, State 
Development Planning Commission and Director General, Office of 
Economics and Finance, Leading Group of the Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee, and are regarded as being influential in grain-
marketing policy. Policy analysis in the MOA based on household surveys 
conducted during the project is claimed to have been influential in recent 
grain-marketing policy experiments in a number of provinces in the 
southeast of China. The advantage to the projects of such influential 
partners in China was remarked on, not only by project reviewers, but also 
by academics and policy-makers in China.49
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Carter and Fang (2001) also argued that the projects made important 
contributions to capacity-building within the MOA and at Nanjing 
Agricultural University which may expedite the process of market reform. 
I have not attempted to value this capacity-building in the course of this 
impact assessment. 
As described below, an important component of this impact assessment 
has been to interview research and policy staff associated with grain 
marketing in China to gain at least a qualitative assessment of the 
influence of this AFP.
5.5 ADP/1998/128—achieving food security in China: 
implications of likely WTO accession
ACIAR is also funding a joint project led by Professor Ron Duncan, 
formerly of the Asia Pacific School of Economics and Management, ANU 
and Professor Justin Lin, Director of the China Center for Economic 
Research at Beijing University which has an objective of examining the 
impact on income distribution in China of agricultural policies that may be 
adopted following China’s accession to the WTO. The analysis is to be 
conducted using a general equilibrium model of the Chinese economy and 
the general equilibrium global trade model (GTAP). The project is 
scheduled to run from July 2000 to December 2004. Research papers and a 
project newsletter can be found at 
<http://apseg.anu.edu.au/policy/ch_98128.php>.
Project ADP/1998/128 is not covered by this impact assessment.
6 Views on grain reform and the 
ACIAR–funded projects 
An important source of information about trends in grain-marketing 
reform and the contribution of the AFPs to grain-market reform was a 
series of interviews with people involved in research and policy-making in 
grain marketing in China. The purpose of the interviews was to increase 
understanding of grain-marketing policy in China; to gain an appreciation 
of the research effort associated with grain-marketing policy in China; to 
attempt to assess the contribution of the AFPs relative to other sources of 
research-based policy advice; and, more narrowly, to gain some 
information about key parameters used in the analysis to follow, such as 50
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the rate at which the AFPs advanced the adoption of reform, the extent of 
price wedges associated with government intervention in grain markets, 
and the responsiveness of producers and consumers to price changes. 
6.1 Interviews
Following Ryan (1999), a structured questionnaire was developed (see 
Appendix 3). Given time constraints, every effort was made to adapt the 
interview to capture the expertise of the person being interviewed, and so 
the questionnaire was used more as a guide than as a strict protocol. From 
the review of the approaches described above for valuing policy research, 
it should be clear that formal sampling techniques and statistical analyses 
of responses are not possible or appropriate in surveying these people.
The sample was small, many interviewees had some connection with the 
projects (as project partners, for example) and the interviews were usually 
attended by Beijing-based ACIAR staff. Nevertheless, the interviews were 
important in shaping views about the significance of the AFPs and their 
strengths and weaknesses, and more generally about the practical 
difficulties in evaluating social science research in an environment where 
there are many research institutions which cooperate as often as they 
compete in the research and policy-making process. Of course the other 
confounding factor was the ability to interpret accurately the views 
expressed. Language was sometimes a barrier, even when an interpreter 
was used. In most cases, the interviews lasted for about two hours
The names of potential candidates to interview were suggested by the 
Australian project team and by other people with a knowledge of grain-
marketing policy in China. The objective was to interview a sample of 
policy-makers and research personnel in China, some of whom were part 
of the project and some of whom were not. Arrangements for the 
interviews were coordinated by the staff in the ACIAR office in Beijing, 
including Mr Chris Brittenden, Ms Lydia Li and Mr Wang Guanglin, who 
also provided interpretation services where necessary. A list of the people 
interviewed follows below. These interviews were conducted mostly in 
China in the period 13–26 September 2003. 
Unfortunately, some key people were unavailable for interview. It was 
hoped that Mr Du Ying, Director General, Department of Rural Economy, 
State Development and Planning Commission and Mr Tang Renjian 
Director General, Office of Economics and Finance, Leading Group of the 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, both of whom had been 
part of the project team while they were members of the Department of 51
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Policy and Law in the Ministry of Agriculture, would be interviewed. A 
strength consistently identified throughout the interviews  was that the 
projects had Du and Tang as partners, and that they had been moved to 
positions even more influential in the policy-making process. The 
unavailability of these two key people highlights one of the real 
difficulties in evaluations of policy research that are based on eliciting the 
views of policy-makers. 
The following people were interviewed:
Professor Tian Weiming, College of Economics and Management, China 
Agricultural University
Dr Huang Yanxin, Chief, Division of Structural Reform Policy, 
Department of Policy and Law, MOA
Dr Wang Zhonghai, Division of Structural Reform Policy, Department of 
Policy and Law, MOA
Professor Huang Jikun, Director of the Center for Chinese Agricultural 
Policy, Chinese Academy of Science
Professor Lui Fengyan, Deputy Director General of the Institute of 
Agricultural Economics, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
Professor Zhang Lubiao, Deputy Director General of the Institute of 
Agricultural Economics, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
Professor Li Xiande, Institute of Agricultural Economics, Chinese 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
Associate Professor Wu Jingxue, Director, Institute of Agricultural 
Economics, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences
Mr Andrew Watson, Representative, The Ford Foundation
Dr Zhang Zhaoxin, Deputy Division Director, Research Center for Rural 
Economy, MOA
Mr Wu Wen, Deputy Division Director, Research Center for Rural 
Economy, MOA
Professor Zhong Funing, Dean, College of Economics and Trade, Nanjing 
Agricultural University
Professor Zhou Shudong, Director of the Agricultural Economics 
Department, College of Economics and Trade, Nanjing Agricultural 
University52
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Professor Chu Baojin, Director of the Department of Finance, College of 
Economics and Trade, Nanjing Agricultural University
Associate Professor Zhu Jing, College of Economics and Trade, Nanjing 
Agricultural University
Professor Cai Fang, Director, Institute of Population and Labor 
Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Largely because of the risk of misrepresenting the views of individuals, 
the general impressions and knowledge gained from these interviews are 
reported, rather than the views attributable to particular people. Some of 
these general observations were also influenced by discussions with others 
outside this formal interview process. They included Dr Jim Ryan; 
Professors Scott Rozelle and Colin Carter from the University of 
California at Davis; Dr Zhanghue Zhou, University of Sydney, Orange; Dr 
Shenngen Fan, IFPRI; and staff at the Australian Embassy in Beijing. 
While in Nanjing, much assistance was given at the local government 
level from Dr Qu Weimin, Vice Director of Agricultural and Forest 
Bureau of the Nanjing Municipal Government and Mr Zheng Lizhi, Vice 
Chief, Nanjing Jianye District People’s Government. Professor Chris 
Findlay and Dr Chunlai Chen, both of whom worked on the projects, were 
also generous with their time and advice. Data on grain prices and 
quantities reported in Table 1 were assembled by Qiu Huanguang from 
Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy. 
6.2 Views on grain-market reform
Views on the future of grain market reform were varied. Some regarded 
further liberalisation as inevitable and some agreed that reform would 
continue but pointed to a number of practical issues to be solved in the 
near future. These practical issues included: the management of the debt of 
the state grain-marketing enterprises, which has increased significantly to 
very high levels as a result of high rates of grain procurement since 1998; 
the disposal of grain in the stockpile, some of which has been there for 
more than 5 years and is therefore of dubious quality; and the high level of 
overmanning within the State Grain Bureau. 
There was, however, a group who foresaw an ongoing role for government 
in grain marketing. This group were concerned about food security and 
social unrest caused both by food insecurity and by income problems for 
farmers. It perhaps also included those in the State Grain Bureau 
concerned about withdrawal by the government. These issues have been 
longstanding concerns of the Chinese Government. People in this group 53
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called for increased economic research into the impact of changes in 
marketing policy, because they claim the distributional impacts are larger 
than accepted by the pro-reform group. They seem particularly concerned 
about farm incomes after deregulation and the risk of relying on imports 
when, in their view, China is unlikely to be a price taker on world markets. 
While they were critical of recent intervention by the government that has 
resulted in large stockpiles and debt for the state-owned enterprises, it was 
not possible to discern from them an alternative system of government 
intervention.
6.3 Distributional consequences of market reform
The complete withdrawal of the government from grain marketing would 
be a major institutional change. It is therefore understandable that there is 
uncertainty about the form of the grain-production sector in China after 
deregulation and the extent to which there might be a need to import grain. 
No doubt any process of structural change will take several years. This 
uncertainty about the impact of grain-market reform was reflected in 
doubt about who would be the winners and losers from such reform, and 
whether China would benefit in aggregate. There was widespread 
consensus that consumers would gain, but views about the impact on 
producers were more varied. 
Most thought that producers of high-quality grains and those for whom the 
opportunity costs of producing grain under quota were high, would be 
winners from grain reform. They would be able to produce crops in which 
they had a comparative advantage. Some argued that freeing producers 
from quota commitments would be a benefit to the large majority of 
producers, at least after some adjustment period. Those in the southeastern 
provinces, until recently forced to produce grain, would shift to other, 
more-profitable crops, to the eventual benefit of themselves and of 
producers in provinces with a comparative advantage in grain production. 
The impact of market reform on poor farmers in grain specialist areas is 
uncertain, as illustrated in the discussion in Huang, Rozelle and Chang 
(2003) about the impact on poor farmers of accession to WTO. Farmers 
receiving a protected price for a fixed quota in isolated markets face 
potentially large losses if the government withdraws. There are two factors 
mitigating this impact. First, several papers have noted that the budgetary 
pressures associated with the 1998 policy have meant that often the state 
marketing bureau has sought to discount grain purchases in a variety of 
ways and hence the losses from marketing reform may not be as severe as 
indicated by the thorough application of current procurement policies. 54
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Second, these producers may benefit as grain production in the 
southeastern provinces declines. While some argue that many poor 
farmers in grain-dependent areas would be worse off as a result of market 
reform, this view was not widely shared. 
State-owned grain-marketing enterprises are a significant component of 
the grain-marketing system in China. They have been a vehicle for the 
implementation of government policy on grain marketing. At times they 
have had the authority to be the monopoly purchaser of grain from 
farmers. They may still handle as much as 70% of grain in China, and they 
employ several million people across the country. No attempt to fully 
understand how they operate was made, but it is clear that these enterprises 
have an incentive and capacity to pursue their own interests, and hence 
they share with producers, private traders and consumers in welfare 
changes associated with government intervention to manage the prices 
and quantities of grain in China. Some have argued that because these 
enterprises pursue their own interests and because of the financial 
constraints they operate under, farm incomes have not been supported to 
the extent indicated by government policy with respect to protection prices 
and marketing quotas. The consensus is that this sector would lose as 
markets opened up to private traders. In implementing government policy 
and in pursuing entrepreneurial opportunities, these state-owned 
enterprises have built up large debts, as noted above. Central and local 
governments would likely be better off under market reform were they not 
expected to support these enterprises. One of the people interviewed noted 
that the cost associated with closing state-owned enterprises was not a 
problem unique the agricultural sector but that the agricultural sector 
could, at least potentially, compensate the state-owned grain sector 
because of efficiency gains elsewhere in the sector. Any attempt to model 
grain marketing in China would need to explicitly consider this sector.
The uncertainty about the impact on agriculture of China’s accession to 
the WTO  has already been discussed. In view of this uncertainty, it is 
perhaps not surprising that, in general, those interviewed did not regard 
WTO accession as being the key factor driving grain-marketing policy in 
China. Some pointed out that, since accession to the WTO, world grain 
prices have exceeded grain prices in China and that the large stockpile of 
grain in China gives some scope to manipulate domestic supply should the 
world price fall. 
The consensus seems to be that the present government will press on with 
grain-market reform, particularly if a process for dealing with the three 
practical issues identified above, related to the operations of the state 
grain-marketing enterprises, can be devised. This process of reform might 55
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take several years. The consensus now seems to be that stability in grain 
markets in China can be achieved through international trade. However, 
the government would intervene in the unlikely event of highly volatile 
prices and shortage of grain causing social unrest within China.
6.4 The contribution of economic research and the 
ACIAR-funded projects
A second set of questions was related to gaining a better understanding of 
the role of empirical research in general in the development of grain-
market policy in China before focusing on the contribution of the AFPs.
It is difficult to judge how effective the extensive body of empirical and 
analytical research and policy development into grain-marketing policy 
has been. As noted in Section 3.2, many research institutions have 
contributed. The history of the 1990s has been a cycle of reform and 
retrenchment, as already noted. Most of those interviewed, however, 
seemed confident that the latest round in the reform process begun in 
southeastern provinces in 2001 would spread, though the process might 
yet take several years, and that empirical research had advanced this 
process. Some argued that, in view of the long history of government 
involvement in grain marketing in China, reform would not occur unless it 
could be presented in a sound analytical and empirical framework. It 
would seem that those institutions with close links to key policy-makers 
have been successful in using their analytical and empirical skills to 
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of recent grain-marketing policy, the 
opportunities for efficiency gains and that food security could be handled 
in other ways. The influence of those more independent of the policy-
making process, such as universities, was less direct.
In summary, many institutions have been involved in funding and 
undertaking research and policy development with respect to grain 
marketing in China. Generally, this body of research has queried the 
effectiveness of policy in recent years and been an advocate for further 
market reform, although researchers at one institution (at least) see a 
continuing but unspecified role for government. 
Turning to the contribution of the AFPs, their strength, already noted, was 
that their partners in China included people who have become very 
influential policy-makers: Mr Du Ying and Mr Tang Renjian, who led the 
project while in the Policy and Law Department of MOA, with Professor 
Zhong Funing from Nanjing Agricultural University. This strength was 
recognised by those who were not partners to the project.56
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The most common weakness identified by those outside the project was a 
lack of contact or communication on the part of the project partners. While 
few outside the project were able to recall papers from the project that they 
had found useful or even read, it is not clear how the performance of the 
project in this respect could have been markedly improved. Research 
papers were accessible on the web, a project newsletter was widely 
circulated and there were regular seminars. Perhaps versions of papers in 
Chinese would have been more accessible, and a summary document of 
key findings or papers from the project would have been welcome. Other 
concerns were the unavailability of the household survey databases to 
those outside the project team. Some project members and reviewers were 
concerned about coordination between the three project partners, but 
specific problems were not apparent.
One of the claims for the project noted by its reviewers was the building of 
capacity within institutions in China, particularly the MOA. It is not clear 
how capacity-building can be measured and valued, and hence little time 
was spent investigating this issue. As part of the project, MOA staff were 
trained on survey techniques, and assistance was presumably provided in 
preparing policy briefs. Little time was spent at the MOA and it was not 
possible to assess the extent of capacity-building. It was noted that the 
household survey program has not continued, but this may be more a 
reflection on the MOA’s financial capacity rather than its scientific 
capacity in this area. As already noted, Professor Zhong Funning has been 
able to attract further funding to extend his analysis of efficiency in 
Chinese agriculture and this may be regarded as evidence of enhanced 
capacity at Nanjing Agricultural University attributable to the AFPs.
A more-general criticism related to the contribution of external 
researchers to policy reform in China. Some argued that the resources used 
by these external research people could be better employed in key research 
academies in China. In relation to the AFPs more specifically, some 
argued that the project had worked with Chinese partners in the MOA who 
had policy-development skills rather than research skills and had 
concentrated on explaining the theory behind market reform, already well-
trodden ground. They were concerned at the lack of empirical research on 
the impact of grain-market reform but seemed unaware of the empirical 
research undertaken as part of the project. This argument about the 
contribution of external researchers prompted careful examination of what 
the Australian connection brought to the ongoing process of grain-
marketing research and policy development in China.
The key reason advanced by many interviewees for believing that the 
AFPs may have been influential in grain market reform was that important 57
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policy-makers were either partners to the projects and/or attended project 
workshops and seminars. The question remains as to why these key 
policy-makers aligned themselves with Australian researchers rather than 
with other institutions inside and outside China. As already noted, neither 
Mr Du Ying nor Mr Tang Renjian were able to be interviewed to ask this 
question directly. However, from the comments of project members and 
interviewees it would seem that the Australian and Nanjing Agricultural 
University researchers brought to the project empirical and analytical 
skills that complemented the policy-development skills and connection to 
the policy-making process existing in the Policy and Law Department of 
the MOA. Furthermore, the independence of the Australian researchers 
may have allowed them to stimulate, more easily than their Chinese 
partners, a debate about alternative grain-marketing policies, and to 
conduct empirical research to identify the failings of existing grain-
marketing policies. Much of the empirical research in the project seemed 
to be designed to show that present policy was unsuccessful. The 
household survey work conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
comparative advantage work from the Nanjing Agricultural University 
fall into this category. 
The original intention of the interviews was to go as far as asking by how 
much did the AFPs advance the speed of reform in grain marketing. Those 
interviewed early in the process were unwilling to make an estimate of 
this. It quickly became apparent that the AFPs were one of many 
interrelated sources of policy advice, and those interviewed were 
uncomfortable about making attributions between institutions, even 
though they viewed the AFPs favourably. From the empirical work 
discussed below, it is apparent that, because of the large potential gains 
from grain market reform in China and the small investment by ACIAR 
and its partners, the break-even time of policy advance is measured in days 
rather than months or years — a time scale difficult to discern in such a 
gross approach as attempted here.
Ryan (1999), in his study of rice policy in Vietnam, was successful in 
answering the question about the rate at which policy reform has been 
adopted. Perhaps his success in this area can be explained by the fact that 
IFPRI was supporting the main source of policy advice in close 
cooperation with the key policy-maker, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development and that, as a result of its recommendations, policy 
reform was actually implemented. The situation with respect to grain 
market reform in China was more similar to the multi-agency multilateral 
trade problems addressed by Schimmelpfennig and Norton (2003) who 
concluded that issues of attribution remained unresolved for these types of 
problems.58
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With the benefit of hindsight, a more defensible approach would be to 
avoid the attribution question by focusing on the impact of the whole body 
of knowledge generated by all the institutions involved in research and 
policy-making with respect to grain marketing and on the resources they 
employed collectively; i.e. conducting a benefit–cost analysis of the 
investment by all agencies into marketing policy. From a qualitative 
review of the AFPs, one could argue that the rate of return to the ACIAR 
investment was likely to have been at least as good as the average rate of 
return earned by total investment made by the group of institutions. The 
drawback of this approach is that it does not allow a judgment to be made, 
except qualitatively, about the performance of the AFPs relative to the 
other institutions, although perhaps this may not be a significant issue for 
ACIAR. The main practical difficulty is that information would be 
required from all institutions about their investments over time in grain-
market research and policy development. 
This approach is also based on the presumption that those interviewed 
would be more comfortable assessing the rate at which policy change has 
been advanced for the total research effort than for the research effort of, 
say, the AFPs. This is still a difficult question for most people, given its 
hypothetical contingent nature. As noted above, in future work of this 
nature, it may be worth consulting with those experienced in contingent 
valuation surveys to devise a set of questions more likely to succeed. 
7 Benefit–cost analysis of economic 
research in grain-market reform in 
China
The adoption of policy reform is modelled in the same way as the adoption 
of technology is normally modelled — as a gradual process taking a 
number of years. This is illustrated in Figure 7, where the y-axis denotes the 
percentage of the total costs of policy retrenchment, 1484 m yuan, that is 
recovered by a process of policy reform from 2001 onwards. However, an 
alternative approach would be to model the adoption of policy reform as an 
instantaneous shock to the system, where the uncertainty lies in which year 
the shock occurs. Discussion of this issue in the literature appears to be 
non-existent.The process was modelled as a gradual one because Chinese 
policy in the past appears to have evolved, although clearly there have been 
years of major shocks, and because it takes time for producers, marketers 
and consumers to respond to policy change. The benefits from economic 59
 IMPACT ASSESSMENT SERIES
  IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF ACIAR-FUNDED PROJECTS ON GRAIN-MARKET REFORM IN CHINA
research into policy reform, including the AFPs, can be viewed as area B in 
Figure 7, which arises because the process of policy reform is completed, in 
this scenario, by the end of 2003 rather than the end of 2004.
7.1 The ‘with’ and ‘without economic policy research’ 
scenarios
A key step in BCA is to define the ‘with economic policy research’ and 
‘without economic policy research’ scenarios (which define the area B). 
Earlier, the cost of policy retrenchment in recent years was estimated to be 
almost 1500 m yuan per year, which is the difference between the actual 
deadweight losses incurred from 1998 to 2001 and the losses that would 
have occurred had the earlier trajectory of marketing reform continued 
such that the ratio of welfare losses to the value of production of the four 
grains stayed at around 0.2%.
The strong impression gained in discussion with experts in grain-marketing 
policy in China was that the current level of government intervention could 
not continue, largely because of the costs associated with acquiring and 
maintaining stockpiles of grain. It also seems to be the case that the 
government is more confident that a lesser degree of government 
intervention will not threaten food security. Finally, as already noted, the 
government has already embarked on a process of market liberalisation in 
provinces in the southeast of the country and this experiment is likely to be 
expanded to other provinces in coming years. There seem to be reasonable 


































Figure  7. Time path of gains from market reform60
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Hence, an appropriate ‘without economic policy research’ scenario would 
seem to me to be one where, by the end of 2004, the year when the impact 
of WTO accession is greatest, the government will have withdrawn from 
grain-market intervention to the extent that the ratio of welfare costs to the 
value of production is back to its trajectory of 0.2%. The 0.2% level of 
support recognises the widespread view that the government is likely to 
continue enter grain markets in a limited way to maintain a minimal grain 
stockpile. Under this scenario, reform is motivated by the high cost of 
present policies, the lessons from past changes in policy, and perhaps by 
the influence of economic policy research in the early 1990s and before.
An alternative ‘without’ scenario may have been to assume that, without 
the ongoing economic-policy research, the level of protection in the late 
1990s may have exceeded the actual rates used here. No evidence to 
suggest that this scenario is any more likely than the conservative 
approach taken here was found. 
The ‘with economic policy research’ scenario and the contribution of the 
AFPs is much more difficult to define. In the BCA to follow, the impact of 
this body of policy economics is modelled as speeding up the process of 
grain-market reform recognising the influence that current economic 
policy research is likely to have on the reform process. The difficulties of 
quantifying this influence have already been discussed, but at least some 
of the academics and public servants interviewed in China had clear links 
to key policy-makers, had published in international scientific journals 
and were successful in attracting external and internal funding. In their 
view, policy-makers were responsive to sound analytical and empirical 
economic research. However, it was not possible to get any strong 
impression as to the time by which the process might be advanced and 
several scenarios were examined. 
A key issue in defining the ‘without’ scenario is identifying the 
contribution of the AFPs.
7.2 Attributing welfare gains to the ACIAR-funded 
projects
Most of the people interviewed in China complimented the AFPs. As 
already noted, they pointed to the close links with key policy-makers and 
the value of the household surveys in providing empirical evidence of the 
ineffectiveness of some existing policy instruments. The projects’ 
reviewers suggested that the projects were likely to be influential.61
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However, none of those interviewed were prepared to put a figure on the 
length of time by which the AFPs might have accelerated the policy 
reform process. Nor did any of those interviewed volunteer that these 
projects were critical to the reform process. 
No doubt we can and do assess subjectively whether or not projects like 
those under review are likely to have been influential. Perhaps as we gain 
experience in evaluating the impact of economic research, through 
‘reasoned discourse’ (to use the terminology of Randall (1993)) some 
agreement will be reached as to what constitutes good practice in making 
these subjective assessments. 
However, it is more difficult to see developing an objective way of 
quantitatively isolating the contribution of particular projects such as the 
AFPs. Good practice at present would seem to be to attempt to measure the 
returns to the total body of research and to assume that those components 
judged to have been influential have earned at least this average rate of return. 
The contribution of the AFPs is examined under two scenarios. The first is 
that the projects were indistinguishable from the body of economic 
research into grain-marketing policy reform and hence earned the same rate 
of return as the group. As will be seen below, the weak link in this approach 
is that an estimate of the expenditure is available on this research for only 
the AFPs and not for total expenditure on this research by the whole group. 
The second approach has been to assess the rate of return to the AFPs if the 
length of the reform process were shortened by one or more months. 
7.3 Expenditure on economic research related to 
grain-marketing policy in China
The expenditure on ACIAR-funded projects ANRE1/1992/028 and 
ADP/1997/021 was gathered from ACIAR financial statements. These 
statements contain information about total expenditure by ACIAR and the 
amounts spent by the partner research organisations in both Australia and 
China. The statements also contain an estimate of the in-kind contributions of 
the Australian and Chinese research partners. The records come in two forms. 
The project contracts contain projected expenditure and estimates of the in-
kind contribution. There are also financial statements for actual expenditures. 
Because the difference between actual and projected expenditure, at least in 
total, is small, a combination of these statements has been used. Expenditure 
information relevant to this assessment is presented in Table 6.62
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Both projects were subject to an external review. In Table 6 an allowance 
of A$7000 has been made in 1997 for ANRE1/1992/028 and in 2001 for 
ADP/1997/021 for these reviews. This estimate was based on the known 
expenditure of one US reviewer in the latter project review.
In nominal terms, ACIAR invested almost A$680,000 on 
ANRE1/1992/028 and A$545,000 on ADP/1997/021. About 80% of 
ACIAR funds for ANRE1/1992/028 were spent in Australia. The share for 
ADP/1997/021 was about 70%. Nominal expenditures were first 
expressed in 2002 dollars using the Australian GDP deflator and then 
either compounded forward or discounted back to 2002 at a rate of 5%. In 
real 2002 dollars, total expenditure, including in-kind contributions, was 
A$1,754,000 on ANRE1/1992/028 and A$945,000 on ADP/1997/021. It 
seems highly likely that the in-kind contributions from research partners is 
understated for ADP/1997/021. From the project contract, Nanjing 
Agricultural University did not claim an in-kind contribution. In this 
analysis, the in-kind costs of ADP/1997/021 were doubled and 
expenditure on the two projects in 2002 dollars was A$2.7m.
Information about expenditure by the various other economic research 
institutions in China that have sought to influence the rate of policy reform 
in grain marketing was not readily available. As noted above, several 
institutions have interests in this area, and it was therefore assumed in one 
Table 6.  ACIAR and In-kind Costs for Projects ANRE1/1992/028 and ADP/1997/021









1994 204,210 138,600 342,810 591,960
1995 206,491 138,600 345,091 561,124
1996 214,547 133,600 348,147 526,667
1997 52,361 0 52,361 74,293
Total 677,609 1,754,044
Project ADP/1997/021:
2000 245,673 74,500 320,173 378,468
2001 245,693 74,500 320,193 344,608
2002 47,300 0 47,300 47,300
2003 7,000 0 7,000 6,472
2004 32,474 0 32,474 27,788
Total 578,140 804,63663
 IMPACT ASSESSMENT SERIES
  IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF ACIAR-FUNDED PROJECTS ON GRAIN-MARKET REFORM IN CHINA
of the scenarios below that the level of expenditure on economic research 
related to grain policy reform has been five times that by the AFPs or 
A$13.5m (2002 dollars) in total. 
7.4 Benefit–cost results
Recall that, for the purposes of this impact assessment, the benefits of 
policy reform are assumed to be a return to a grain-marketing regime 
where the welfare costs of government intervention are about 0.2% of the 
total value of production in China of rice, wheat, maize and soybean, from 
an average of about 0.5% between 1998 and 2001. A return to this policy 
trajectory was estimated to be worth almost 1500m yuan per year. The 
Chinese Government appears to be heading in this direction already, and 
in the analysis it is assumed that, by the end of 2004, welfare costs will 
again be about 0.2% of the value of production. The impact of economic 
research (including the AFPs) has been assumed to be a shortening of the 
time by which this target is achieved. Note again that it is assumed that the 
reform process is gradual, much like the adoption of new technology, and 
that economic research brings forward the time by which the process is 
complete. An alternative approach likely to lead to larger BCRs would be 
to assume that economic research results in the reform process beginning 
earlier than otherwise. 
From Table 7, under the base scenario, the present value of benefits is 
A$88.6m, A$40.3m and A$12.7m when reform is advanced by 6, 3 and 1 
month, respectively. The NPVs range from A$85.9m, where reform is 
completed 6 months earlier and the only costs considered are ACIAR’s, to 
–A$0.8m where the costs are assumed to be A$13.5m and reform is 
advanced by only a month. The corresponding BCRs are 32.8:1 and 0.9:1, 
respectively. These benefit–cost results are slightly lower if the reform 
process extends to the end of 2005 rather than 2004.
There are two scenarios worthy of closer consideration. Focusing first on 
the total body of economic research, if the process of reform is advanced 
by between 3 and 6 months before the end of 2004, a reasonable prospect 
in view of the current ‘experiment’ in the southeastern provinces, the 
present value of benefits from a return to the pre-1998 reform trajectory 
(i.e. not a complete elimination of government intervention) is estimated 
to be between A$40.3m and A$88.6m. Assuming that the cost of this total 
body of research is around A$13.5m, the NPV ranges from A$26.8m to 
A$75.1m and the BCR is between 3:1 and 6.6:1. 64
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Table 7. Some benefit–cost scenarios.
Time by which policy reform process is reduced
6 months 3 months 1 month
Base scenario (1500 m yuan costs):
Present value of benefits A$(2002)m 88.6 40.3 12.7
Net present value (NPV) A$(2002)m for expenditure by:
ACIAR projects (actual)
A$(2002) 2.7m 85.9 37.6 10.0
All research institutions (estimate)
A$(2002) 13.5m 75.1 26.8 –0.8
Benefit–cost ratios (BCRs) for expenditure by:
ACIAR projects (actual)
A$(2002) 2.7m 32.8  14.9 4.7 
All research institutions (estimate)
A$(2002) 13.5m 6.6  3.0 0.9 
Elastic supply scenario (2000 m yuan costs):
Present value of benefits A$(2002)m 117.5 53.4 16.8
NPV A$(2002)m for expenditure by:
ACIAR projects (actual)
A$(2002) 2.7m 114.8 50.7 14.1
All research institutions (estimate)
A$(2002) 13.5m 104.0 39.9 3.3
BCRs for expenditure by:
ACIAR projects (actual)
A$(2002) 2.7m 43.5  19.8 6.2 
All research institutions (estimate)
A$(2002) 13.5m 8.7  4.0 1.2 
Larger welfare costs scenario (3000 m yuan costs):
Present value of benefits A$(2002)m 179.1 81.4 25.6
NPV A$(2002)m for expenditure by:
ACIAR projects (actual)
A$(2002) 2.7m 176.4 78.7 22.9
All research institutions (estimate)
A$(2002) 13.5m 165.6 67.9 12.1
BCRs for expenditure by:
ACIAR projects (actual)
A$(2002) 2.7m 66.4  30.2 9.5 
All research institutions (estimate)
A$(2002) 13.5m 13.3  6.0 1.9 65
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If the contribution of the AFPs has been to advance the process by a month, 
again a reasonable prospect given the role attributed to the Department of 
Policy and Law in the MOA in the southeastern provinces ‘experiment’, 
then the present value of the investment is A$12.7m and, given the cost of 
the ACIAR-funded research is approximately A$2.7m, the NPV for the 
AFPs is A$10m and the BCR from these projects is in the order of 4.7:1. 
This BCA is based on an estimate that the average cost of the higher level 
of government intervention since 1997 has been about 1500 m yuan. There 
is great uncertainty about this estimate. Two further scenarios were 
assessed and reported in Table 7. In one scenario, supply elasticities were 
doubled, increasing the annual cost to about 2000m yuan. In this case, the 
present value of benefits for economic research in total in advancing 
policy reform by from 3 to 6 months is estimated to be between A$53.4m 
and A$117.5m. The corresponding NPVs are in the range 
A$39.9m–A$104m and the BCRs range from 4.0:1 to 8.7:1. For ACIAR 
advancing reform by one month, the present value of benefits is A$16.8m, 
the NPV is A$14.1m and the BCR is 6.2:1.
The choice of static, single-industry national market models, and errors in 
the parameter values used for net protection rates and supply and demand 
response, mean that an estimate of the costs of greater intervention is 
biased. Largely because the opportunity for farmers to move from grains 
with production quotas to other more profitable crops has not be explicitly 
modelled, it is more likely that intervention costs have been 
underestimated. If welfare costs were 3000 m yuan rather than 1500 m 
yuan, then the present value of economic research in total in advancing 
policy reform by from 3 to 6 months is between A$81.4m and A$179.1m 
and the NPV ranges from A$67.9m to A$165.6m and the BCRs are 6.0:1 
to 13.3:1. For ACIAR advancing reform by one month, the present value is 
A$25.6m, the NPV A$22.9m and the BCR 9.5:1.
8 Conclusions
An assessment has been made of two projects (ANRE1/1992/028 and 
ADP/1997/021) funded by ACIAR dealing with economic research into 
grain-marketing policy in China. The focus of these projects has been on 
presenting theoretical and empirical arguments that China would benefit 
from efficiency gains if there was less intervention by the government in 
grain marketing. ACIAR has routinely conducted impact assessments of 
investments it has made in research leading to the development of new 66
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agricultural technologies. An objective of this impact assessment has been 
to determine how well economic evaluation procedures can be applied to 
economic policy research. 
Every effort has been made to quantify the benefits and costs associated 
with the AFPs. Since 1994, real expenditure (2002 dollars) on these 
projects, including in-kind contributions from partners, has amounted to 
about A$2.7m. In the late 1990s, the extent of intervention in grain 
marketing by Chinese government increased rather than decreased. In 
quantifying benefits in this impact assessment, the contribution of the 
projects has been assumed to be bringing forward in the time by which the 
Chinese Government returns to a process of policy reform that was evident 
until the late 1990s. The annual welfare gains to China from a return to this 
reform process may be in the order of 1500 m yuan. This represents the 
difference in losses to China between the situation of the late 1990s, when 
the welfare costs of intervention were about 0.5% of the value of grain 
production and the situation before that, when welfare costs had been 
about 0.2% of the value of grain production. 
If the total body of economic policy research in recent years brings 
forward policy reform from the end of 2004 by between 3 and 6 months, 
then the present value of benefits for this body of research is estimated to 
be between A$40.3m and A$88.6m, the NPV ranges from A$26.8m to 
A$75.1m and the BCR is between 3:1 to 6.6:1. If the contribution of the 
AFPs in isolation has been to advance the process by a month, again a 
reasonable prospect given the role attributed to the Department of Policy 
and Law in MOA in the southeastern provinces ‘experiment’, then the 
present value of the investment is A$12.7m, the NPV for the AFPs is 
A$10m and the BCR from these projects is in the order of 4.7:1. Note the 
hypothetical nature of these scenarios.
This empirical analysis is highly qualified, not the least because important 
potential impacts of the projects could not be quantified and because policy 
reform in China has yet to occur. These qualifications and the qualitative 
outcomes of the projects are discussed in detail in the body of the report. 
Other scenarios examined included one where supply response was 
doubled (increasing the welfare costs of intervention) and one where the 
likelihood that the welfare cost of recent intervention was underestimated. 
If welfare costs were 3000 m yuan rather than 1500 m yuan, then the 
present value of economic research in total in advancing policy reform by 
from 3 to 6 months is between A$81.4m and A$179.1m, the NPV ranges 
from A$67.9m to A$165.6m and the BCRs are 6.0 to 13.3. For ACIAR 67
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advancing reform by one month, the present value is A$25.6m, the NPV 
A$22.9m and the BCR 9.5:1.
Three key factors have made an empirical BCA of these projects difficult. 
First, there are no published estimates of the welfare costs to China from 
intervention in grain marketing. Second, since the mid 1990s the level of 
government intervention in grain marketing in China has increased. 
Hence, the benefits of this project in the form of policy reform are yet to be 
fully realised. Third, there are many government and academic research 
institutions in China, sometimes supported with external funds, which 
conduct research to influence grain-marketing policy in China. There is no 
objective way of isolating the contribution of the AFPs to decisions about 
grain-marketing policy in China. 
The difficulties encountered in empirically assessing the contribution of 
these ACIAR-funded projects in economic policy research mean that a 
final assessment of the value of these projects to China and ACIAR should 
be based on a broader range of criteria than a highly qualified empirical 
estimate of the potential benefits from efficiency gains in grain marketing 
in China. This broader set of criteria relates to project-management 
processes, project outputs, extensions from the projects and outcomes that 
are difficult to quantify, such as capacity-building. Key arguments for the 
success of the projects have been the strength of the Chinese partners and 
capacity-building within the Department of Policy Reform and Law in the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The communications record of both projects 
appears impressive. However, the projects’ objective of measuring inter-
regional grain flows within China was not met. 
A final point of discussion concerns the feasibility of evaluating economic 
policy research. In this assessment, economic policy research has been 
evaluated using an approach similar to that used in evaluating an agricultural 
extension project, where the benefits are recognised as a faster rate and 
perhaps higher level of adoption of a new technology. In both cases, the 
analyst must confront issues of attribution and of identifying a realistic 
technology adoption/ policy-reform scenario, including response lags. 
However, the causal links between a project and the outcomes sought seem 
far weaker in the case of policy research than in the case of traditional 
agricultural technologies, particularly in situations where there are many 
sources of policy research and advice. In the case of agricultural 
technologies, there is usually evidence that some farmers have found the 
technology profitable enough to warrant its adoption. This provides the 
analyst with some empirical basis for assumptions about the rate and extent 
of adoption. This is not the case for a single government policy-maker 
facing ever-changing economic and social conditions. Hence, benefit–cost 68
 IMPACT ASSESSMENT SERIES
  IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF ACIAR-FUNDED PROJECTS ON GRAIN-MARKET REFORM IN CHINA
analyses of economic policy research will often be more conjectural than 
those of agricultural technologies. Perhaps, as has been the case for the 
evaluation of technologies, analysts will become more experienced in 
developing the reasonable ‘with’ and ‘without’ policy scenarios that are the 
key to sensible benefit–cost analyses.
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Appendix 1. Methodologies to 
evaluate social science research 
Review of approaches based on Bayesian decision 
theory 
Policy-makers have to take actions (choose between policies) where the 
consequences depend on which state of nature emerges from a set of 
states. The Bayesian approach to valuing agricultural economics research 
is based on the view that the value of such research is in reducing the 
uncertainty about the likelihood that any of the possible states of nature 
will occur and, hence, about the consequences of alternative policies. 
Agricultural economics research is valuable if it changes the prior 
probabilities held by decision-makers about these states in such a way that 
their policy choice is altered in a welfare-enhancing way. To apply the 
Bayesian decision theory (BDT) framework, information is required about 
the efficiency gains from alternative policies under a range of states of 
nature, the prior probabilities held by policy-makers about the states of 
nature, and the chances that agricultural economics research delivers 
information accurate enough to allow the derivation of posterior 
probabilities that differ from prior probabilities. Gardner (1999) points out 
that these are the three parameters that drive the value of agricultural 
economics research in this policy context.
Papers by Gardner (1999) by Schimmelpfennig and Norton (2003) are two 
prominent examples in the literature of the application of BDT. 
Schimmelpfennig and Norton applied BDT in three case studies of 
agricultural economics research conducted within the Economics 
Research Service of the USDA, partly to identify the conditions under 
which BDT is an appropriate methodology. While the mechanics of 
deriving posterior probabilities and applying these to estimates of the 
efficiency changes under alternative actions and states of nature are amply 
described in these papers (with a spreadsheet model presented in 
Schimmelpfennig and Norton), there are some issues in defining the states 
of nature and eliciting probabilities that are less settled. 
A key component in applying the BDT approach is to elicit from policy-
makers prior probabilities and the likelihood that agricultural economics 
research information is accurate. Schimmelpfennig and Norton (2003) 
discussed this issue at some length, particularly the issue of the trade-off 
between sample size and the need to give most weight to those, perhaps 73
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few, people who actually made the decision. They concluded that ‘one 
must be willing to accept subjective probabilities from a very small 
number of individuals, which leaves one uneasy even if the interviewers 
are knowledgeable and confident’. Uncertainty about the value of 
agricultural economics research increases significantly if the few policy-
makers hold divergent views about the key probabilities. They noted that 
the policy context described in the survey process was likely to influence 
survey responses (a ‘framing’ effect). 
Another issue discussed in part by Schimmelpfennig and Norton (2003) 
was that raised by multiple sources of agricultural economics research and 
multiple constituencies in the policy-making process. In a couple of their 
examples, the USDA was basing policy decisions largely on agricultural 
economics research conducted by its Economic Research Service. As 
distinct from this largely in-house policy-making, they considered an 
example concerning multilateral trade negotiations where the countries 
involved received advice from a variety of sources of agricultural 
economics research and were each likely to weight differently the 
distributional consequences of various alternative policies. The procedure 
for applying BDT in this latter example is much less clear. At the very 
least, the problem of attribution between several sources of policy advice 
arises. This problem of multiple sources of analysis applies to grain 
marketing in China.
An important issue that neither Gardner (1999) nor Schimmelpfennig and 
Norton (2003) discussed in any detail is how to define the problem to 
which BDT is to be applied or, more specifically, how to define the 
uncertain ‘states of nature’ that will determine the outcomes from the 
policy alternatives. The possibilities range from quite specific states, such 
as whether or not export demand for a commodity is elastic (Gardner), to 
far more generic states such as whether or not a particular policy action, 
such as advertising (Gardner) or a food safety program (Schimmelpfennig 
and Norton), was profitable. 
Review of economic surplus approach
There are some important differences between the papers of Ryan (1999) 
and Schimmelpfennig and Norton (2003). Ryan is particularly interested 
in the attribution question — the role of IFPRI research in the change in 
rice-marketing policy in Vietnam, for example. Vietnam had embarked on 
a process of policy reform. He estimated the gross benefits from rice-
market reform using a trade model developed by IFPRI. He did not use a 
Bayesian approach based on how research provided information to change 74
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perceptions of the outcomes from policy change, but concentrated on 
assessing how much more quickly rice market reform occurred as a result 
of IFPRI research. The empirical purpose of the survey was to estimate 
this change in the time taken to introduce to policy change. Hence, it 
seems legitimate for Ryan to solicit views from a range of stakeholders, 
some of whom may not have actually participated in the policy decision 
but who were informed observers.
Ryan (1999) interviewed 35 people ‘who were either partners in the 
research endeavour or stakeholders in the outcomes’. Policy-makers 
interviewed were concentrated in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development and the Ministry of Planning and Investment, but there were 
none from the ministries of Trade or Finance. Ryan does not explicitly 
discuss whether he was successful in interviewing the key policy-makers, 
nor does he explicitly discuss how he weighted the responses from these 
35 people. His conclusion was that the IFPRI work had been a major, 
though not sole influence, on decisions by the Government of Vietnam to 
relax export quotas on rice. Only a few of those who were interviewed 
were prepared to make a judgment about the time by which IFPRI research 
hastened policy change. The estimates ranged from 6 months to more than 
2 years. Ryan analysed two scenarios; for one and two years. 
The results of the IFPRI modelling work suggested that there were large 
efficiency gains to be had with little risk to food security and with few 
among the poor (largely the urban poor) being made worse off. The 
benefits from policy change stabilised at about A$80m per year from 
1999. If IFPRI hastened policy change by only 1 year, the NPV of its 
contribution was A$45m giving a BCR of 56:1. If IFPRI hastened policy 
change by two years, the NPV rose to A$91m and the BCR to 114:1.75
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Appendix 2. Project papers 
Project ANRE1/1992/028
Brown, L.R. 1995. Who will feed China: wakeup call for a small planet. New 
York, Norton.
Cai, F. 1996. Comparative advantage and the internationalisation of China’s 
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Chinese countryside. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
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Appendix 3. Questionnaire
Questionnaire used in interviews with research and policy-makers in 








In preparing to do this project I have read several reviews of grain 
marketing policy in China. Many of these papers point to some periods 
when the private sector has been allowed to take an important role in grain 
marketing and some periods when the government has strengthened its 
role in grain marketing.
  Do you share the view that since the 1980s there have been periods in 
which the roles of the State and of private grain traders have moved 
back and forth?
  Why do you think there have been these changes in direction about 
the roles of the private and government sectors?
  How important has the issue of food security been?
  Why do you think government intervention in grain marketing has 
been less successful than hoped for?
  Is China now growing grain in regions that are best suited for grain 
production?
  To what extent are grain markets in china now integrated in that for 
example the price for wheat moves to a similar extent and direction 
across China?90
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  Has the role of private grain traders continued to grow?
  In your view which sectors of the community will benefit from the 
government withdrawing from grain marketing and which sectors 
will lose out?
  Why?
  In your view what is the probability that a private grain marketing 
system will provide net benefits to the Chinese people?
  In your view how important are infrastructure problems such as road 
and rail networks as constraints to China being able to gain all the 
benefits from more integrated markets. If the total potential gains 
from integrated markets were of the order of 300 million yuan have 
you any feel for the percentage of these gains that could arise from 
market reform as compared to the gains from a more efficient 
transport system?
  I am aware of the experiments since about 2000 in grain marketing in 
the provinces of Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Gunagdong, and in 2001 in 
Shanghai, Hainan, Fujian, Beijing and Tianjin provinces. Have these 
experiments been successful? From here do you think that the role of 
the private sector will continue to grow and that large scale 
government intervention in the future is unlikely?
  What do you think is the probability that these experiments will be 
successful and lead to the general withdrawal of the government from 
grain marketing?
  How soon before these experiments are extended across all of China?
  Is it a requirement of WTO that China withdraws from grain 
marketing or would this have happened anyway?
  Has WTO brought forward the time that the government has 
withdrawn from grain marketing
  There are a number of organisations in government departments and 
universities, some funded by external organisations like ACIAR or 
the World Bank who conduct research and analysis of grain 
marketing issues. How important is research and analysis in policy 
making in the grains industries or are decisions largely made on 91
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political grounds? In your experience how does the government make 
these decisions about its role in grain marketing?
  In your view who have been the important sources of research and 
analysis with respect to grain marketing policy in China? 
The next set of questions focuses on the ACIAR-funded projects: 
  Do you know any of the Australian or Chinese research people who 
worked on the ACIAR-funded projects?
  Can you recall a research paper you read or a seminar you attended 
that resulted from the ACIAR-funded projects?
  Can you recall any findings from this research paper or seminar that 
you found striking?
  Have you used any findings from the ACIAR-funded projects in a 
policy context?
  If yes could you indicate how?
  Have you used any findings from the ACIAR-funded projects in a 
research context?
  If yes could you indicate how?
  Have you cited ACIAR-funded project findings
  Have you used any findings from the ACIAR-funded projects in a 
teaching context?
  If yes could you indicate how?
  How could the adoption or acceptance of the ACIAR-funded results 
been improved?
  What other research institutions or people do you think have made 
important contributions to grain market policy in China?
  examples
  How would you rate the influence of the ACIAR-funded work 
relative to these other sources?  What are the strengths and weaknesses of these other sources in 
information relative to ACIAR?
  Do you think the ACIAR-funded projects have bought forward the 
time at which the State withdraws from active participation in grain 
marketing?
  If yes by how many months – 3, 6, 12 months?
  Can you suggest anyone I should talk to who is critical of the ACIAR-
funded projects specifically or of the grain market reform process in 
general?
  Do you have any other comments which may help me in my 
evaluation of the ACIAR-funded projects?
Some questions for economists about parameter values used above?
  I have assumed protection rates for wheat, rice, maize and soybeans of 
12, –3, 32 and 15% based on the research by Huang et al. Are these 
rates of protection reasonable in a relative sense?
  in an absolute sense?
  I have assumed that the supply of grain in China is more elastic than 
the demand for grain. Reasonable or not?
  I have assumed smaller crops are more elastic in demand and supply 
than the larger crops. Reasonable or not? 
  Where would I find the most recent estimates of demand and supply 
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